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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem area 
Historically speaking, intercountry child adoption (ICA) has been a social phenomenon 
that emerged due to social, political, and economic crises and circumstances in sending 
countries. After World War II child adoption was considered a humanitarian act through 
which abandoned and neglected children from the war-torn European countries e.g. 
Germany and France got loving families and homes within North America. But the 
Korean War has shifted the course. Since then, it has primarily been children from 
developing countries that have been sent to developed countries. ICA has generally been 
associated with the “rescue mission with strong Christian fundamentalist and 
particularly Lutheran undertones, while it came to be perceived as a progressive act of 
solidarity during the left-liberal 1960s and 1970s” (Hübinette, 2006:1).   
The sentimentalized picture of adoption created by western developed countries has 
had such a strong influence that it outshined what was actually happening. The 
increasing demand for children in Western countries created a huge industry through 
which children were transferred without any regulatory mechanisms. This was a 
favorable environment for business to flourish and adoption agencies, attorneys, 
facilitation services and advertisers became the profit vein of adoption. In 1978 Posner 
in his “baby-selling article” opened the veil of sentimentalism and exposed the financial 
incentives and market forces that drove adoption. However, this became a subject to 
numerous critics who argued to reject the existence of a market in adoption. The issue of 
ICA got attention in the human trafficking discourse too and it thus became clear that 
ICA needs more regulation and that children need to be protected (Smolin, 2004). 
It was against this backdrop that the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989) 
and the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (otherwise known as the Hague Convention, 1993) were passed 
by the United Nations to “regulate” intercountry adoptions in the “best interests of the 
child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international 
law” (HCCH,1993;CRC,1989). This international legal framework on ICA was couched in 
a manner to remove from it profit and market motivations, to be able to place children 
involved in adoption “above the hustle and bustle of the market-place so as to preserve 
their dignity” (Prichard, 1984:352) and make adoption purely “a child welfare model for 
abandoned, abused, neglected and orphaned” children (Hanan, 1997 cited in Goodwin, 
2006:63). However, note must be taken that, not all countries involved in ICA have 
Page 5 of 65 
 
signed and ratified the international conventions. Somalia, South Sudan and USA are 
member states of the UN that have not ratified CRC, and 32, mostly sending countries, 
have not ratified the Hague Convention.  
In addition, the practices in ICA have demonstrated that ICA is a contested field. As 
argued by Dillon the CRC was a very groundbreaking document that “showed children 
as subjects of rights, as autonomous beings, as more than the possessions of their 
parents and of their cultures or nations”(Dillon, 2003:190). However, McKinney argues 
that “its stance on intercountry adoption is vague, and many of its provisions may be 
interpreted to support contradictory conclusions concerning the appropriateness of 
intercountry adoption” (McKinney, 2007:364).  Furthermore, as the CRC and Hague 
Convention were adopted under the auspices of human rights, they themselves are 
subject to the critical appraisal on their universality with western fundamental 
principles.  
Although the regulations proscribe buying and selling of children and the Hague 
Convention (HCCH) states that “only costs and expenses, including reasonable 
professional fees of persons involved in the adoption, may be charged or paid” (HCCH, 
1998: art. 32, 2), many critics of intercountry child adoption argue, that the “fees are so 
disproportionately large for the child’s home country that they encourage corruption 
and that along the way, the international adoption industry has become a market often 
driven by its customers.” (Graff, 2008: 60). 
Thus, despite the clear proscription of international laws on marketization and 
profiteering in ICA, there is evidence that, “international adoption has become an 
industry driven by money” (Graff, 2008:50). The nature of contemporary ICA, Kapstein 
argues, is reflective of “financial transactions among adoptive parents, birth mothers, 
and adoption agencies that [clearly] resemble payments” with “children, [like] most 
precious resources [commodities] being traded across borders” (Goodwin, 2006:61).  
This situation leaves much to be desired. First and foremost, one is unable to clearly 
determine whether international adoption agencies work to find homes for needy 
children or to find children for Western homes. Second and perhaps most important, 
given the establishment of international regulatory frameworks - the regimes1 in ICA, 
one wonders why market forces and profiteering incentives are still lingering in 
intercountry adoption.    
                                                          
1
 The term ‘regimes’ relates to our chosen theory which will be presented later on.  
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1.2 Contextualization 
In this part we are going to present intercountry adoption in its context. We will thus 
present ICA as a phenomenon, account for the history of and recent tendencies in ICA 
and elaborate on the international regulative framework of ICA. We use this as the 
prelude to the forthcoming analysis in order to ‘set the scene’. 
1.2.1 ICA as a phenomenon 
According to UNICEF, adoption “is a welfare and protection measure that enables an 
orphaned or definitively abandoned child to benefit from a permanent family. An 
intercountry adoption (ICA) is seen as one that involves a change in the child’s habitual 
country of residence, whatever the nationality of the adopting parents” (UNICEF, 
1998:2). Thus ICA “involves the movement of children from one country to another” 
(Breuning, 2013:2). 
For the avoidance of doubt, “intercountry adoption” (ICA) does not mean “international 
adoption” (IA). To illustrate: A Ghanaian girl adopted by Ghanaian citizens living in 
Denmark is involved in an intercountry but not an international adoption. If she were 
adopted by Danish citizens resident in Ghana, the form of adoption would be 
international but not intercountry. It would be both international and intercountry if she 
were adopted by Danish citizens in Denmark 
Therefore, ICA is different from IA in the sense that, whereas ICA involves a change in 
the child’s habitual country of residence, IA applies to an adoption that involves parents 
of a nationality other than that of the child. Regardless of whether or not they reside — 
and continue to reside — in the child’s habitual country of residence and the nationality 
of the adopting parents. Although, the terms may denote some resemblance between the 
two forms of adoption, we argue that ICA is not the same as IA and, for the purpose of 
our study we focus on ICA. 
1.2.2 History  
UNICEF (1998) and Kapstein (2003) present similar historical accounts about the 
genesis of ICA. Both of them date the beginning of ICA to after World War II. For 
example, UNICEF presents its accounts as follows: “When it first began to be practiced 
widely, in the aftermath of the Second World War, intercountry adoption was an ad hoc 
humanitarian response to the situation of children orphaned by war. Families in the 
United States mainly, but also in Canada, Australia and Europe adopted orphans from 
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Germany, Italy and Greece - all countries where emergency situations prevailed. To a 
lesser extent children were also adopted from China and Japan” (UNICEF, 1998:2). 
According to Kapstein the statistics show that “at the end of the Vietnam conflict in 
1975, some 3,000 children were adopted by foreign parents as part of Operation 
Babylift” (Kapstein, 2003:116).  
ICA, as the historical accounts show, started as a purely altruistic and humanitarian 
endeavor – “a child welfare model for abandoned, abused, neglected and orphaned 
youth” (Hanan, 1997 cited Goodwin, 2006:63). Initially, concerns about intercountry 
adoption were linked mainly to problems arising from the different legal systems in 
receiving countries and countries of origin. Also of concern were the perceived 
problems of adjustment of the children in their new environment and the ability of the 
adoptive parents to meet their special needs in this regard. Increasingly the ethical issue 
was raised as to whether it is desirable to remove a child from his or her country rather 
than to provide necessary assistance and protection on the spot (UNICEF, 1998). 
It was later in the 1970s, (with the “baby boom” generation) however, that “serious 
concerns began to be expressed over the “mass exportation” of children from 
economically developing nations”. A full-fledged and clear “demand” for adoptive 
children had become apparent in the West and was accompanied by an ever-larger 
throng of agencies and intermediaries using more or less acceptable means to satisfy it” 
(Ibid.:2).  Two main reasons have been ascribed to this development: First, demographic 
and social changes, such as increased use of contraceptive aids; the legalization of 
abortion; the higher workforce participation of women; the postponement of childbirth 
to later ages ; an increasing de-stigmatization of single motherhood; infertility and; 
highly regulated domestic adoption processes in developed countries, simultaneously 
increased people’s need for children and reduced the number of children available for 
domestic adoption (Graff, 2008; UNICEF, 1998).  
Second, high incidence of unplanned births, poverty, fertility rates, and restrictive 
abortion regulations in developing countries led to a large number of children in need of 
adoption (Graff, 2008; UNICEF, 1998).  Therefore the “structural demand” for children in 
adoption in high-income countries was being met with the “structural supply” of children 
available’ for adoption abroad in low-income countries (UNICEF, 1998: 2-3). ICA 
therefore was gradually taking shape as a convergence of “demand” and “supply”. One 
striking feature of ICA which belied its altruistic nature was the use of the Internet to 
promote adoption in ways that often involve the marketing of children — as well as 
spawning private adoptions and offering ‘shortcuts’ to the legal adoption process (Ibid.). 
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ICA, which historically evolved as a child welfare measure for an individual child in need 
of care and protection, was losing the “welfare” and “altruistic” contents it was originally 
intended to be. Instead it was becoming “a lucrative profit-making activity, 
sometimes involving major financial interests and its own lobby, in which 
children are treated as commodities” (emphasis added) (UNICEF, 1998:3).  
 
It is against this backdrop that, intercountry adoption regimes evolved. Consistent with 
the evolution of all international regimes, ICA Regimes were established to cure the 
mischief that had entered intercountry adoption such as – profiteering, the treatment of 
children as commodities and, dictation of the market by forces of “demand” and 
“supply”.  
1.2.3 Recent tendencies 
Selman (2012) has described the recent trends in intercountry adoption and analyzed 
the factors behind the numbers with a particular focus on variations in the key sending 
and receiving countries. “The period from 1998-2010 saw a remarkable rise and fall in 
the number of children adopted via intercountry adoption each year. In 1998, there 
were just under 32,000 adoptions; by 2004 this number had risen to over 45,000; by 
2009 the world total had fallen to under 30,000 – less than in 1998 – and the decline 
continued in 2010” (Selman, 2012:3). The group of key receiving countries with the 
highest numbers of adoptions is USA (half of all intercountry adoptions), Spain, France, 
Italy and Canada. However, Norway, Spain and Sweden lay claims to the highest ICA- 
rates in the world with a figure proportional to the overall population (Selman, 2012).   
Even though the increase in ICA was recorded in all major receiving countries, the fall in 
the world total number was distributed heterogeneously marked by contrasting trends 
in receiving countries. While global numbers fell by 35 percent between 2004 and 2009, 
Canada, Italy and France, in contrast, saw an increase in 2009, which in the case of Italy 
continued through 2010. Numbers rose in France due in large part to a rise in adoptions 
from Vietnam and Haiti (Selman, 2012: 3). 
Preferential ties have been established between receiving and sending countries. For 
instance, North America receives nine times more children from Guatemala than West 
European countries (Ibid.). Northern America has also received more children from 
Kazakhstan and the Republic of Korea while Western European countries prefer to 
adopt from Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Latvia and Thailand (UN DESA, 
2009). Thus as Kane argues, that as “with other types of migration, cultural, political and 
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historical ties shape the flows of children adopted through intercountry procedures” 
(Ibid.: 80). Accordingly, Spanish parents prefer to adopt children originating from Latin 
America. The francophone countries, as Haiti, Mali and Madagascar, are the main 
resource of adoptive children for French families. Likewise, the Korean War has created 
ties between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea, which resulted in the high numbers of 
Korean children, adopted by US parents (Kane, 1993). 
1.2.4 The international regulative framework of ICA 
In the late 1970s, when market forces began to determine the pace of intercountry 
adoption, “serious concerns began to be expressed over the “mass exportation” of 
children from economically developing nations to the developed West (UNICEF, 1998: 
2-3). This led to the establishment of several international normative frameworks or ICA 
Regimes i.e. the UND, the CRC and the HCCH, to flush out improper financial gains, 
payments, profit and remunerations and, the sale of children from ICA. Here we give a 
short introduction to each of the Conventions and the provisions related to ICA: 
The United Nations Declaration 
This Declaration was established December 3rd, 1986 at the 95th plenary meeting of The 
UN. The relevant provisions that pertain to ICA are Articles 17 to 24. For instance Article 
17 provides that, “If a child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot 
in any suitable manner be cared for in the country of origin, intercountry adoption may 
be considered as an alternative means of providing the child with a family”. 
The Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC)  
This Convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20th November, 1989 and entered into force on 
2nd September 1990. The relevant provision specifically dealing with adoption is Article 
21, which sets out the basic principles to be followed when considering domestic and 
intercountry adoption for a child. It (Article 21b) considers ICA only “if the child cannot 
be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for 
in the child's country of origin” (CRC, 1989: art. 21b). So far 140 states have signed the 
Convention and 193 states are registered as parties2 to the Convention.  
                                                          
2
 A country may become a party to a treaty by signing the treaty during the period in which the treaty 
is open for signature and then to ratify the treaty. However, a country may also become a party by 
acceding to or by accepting the treaty.  
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The Hague Convention (HCCH) 
 This Convention was adopted on 29 May 1993 and entered into force on 1 May 1995. 
More than 60 countries and about 10 international NGO’s took part in its drafting. It has 
as its principal objectives:  
 to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the 
best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as 
recognized in international law; 
 to establish a system of cooperation amongst Contracting States to ensure that 
those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or 
traffic in children; 
 to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in accordance 
with the Convention  
(Directly quoted from the HCCH, 1993:art. 1) 
Although, the Hague Convention was made to touch on a wide range of issues pertaining 
to ICA, it dedicated five clear and elaborate provisions to making sure that, ICA does not 
turn into a money/profit making venture – an indication of how ICA Regimes took a dim 
view on the “emerged market” in ICA during the “baby boom” generation in the 1970s. 
1.3 Literature review 
ICA has not gained prominence in mainstream GPE literature despite the clear 
economic, financial, marketization and commodification issues herein - issues that are 
highly related to GPE analysis. As a result, ICA has typically been dealt with academically 
from the psychological, sociological and legal perspectives. Furthermore, most of the 
literature in ICA is preoccupied with the normative aspect of whether the best interest 
of the child is served in adoption, an aspect of minor relevance to GPE. With this in mind 
we seek to present the ‘state of the art’ literature in ICA in order to use this as our 
backdrop for the rest of the project. 
We group the presented literature in two: the legal-socio-psychological debate and the 
marketization debate, which will both be presented in turn. Afterwards, we review some 
of the most prominent literature on the international legal framework in ICA, namely 
the international declarations and conventions that regulate ICA. This review will be 
short as we will come back to this later in the project.    
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The legal-socio-psychological debate 
The leading scholars in the legal-socio-psychological debate, Bartholet3 and Smolin4, 
have taken opposing stands on the regulation of ICA using the ‘subsidiarity principle5’ of 
the Hague Convention in the context of how the social and psychological development of 
the child can be ensured. Bartholet argues that intercountry adoption should be 
embraced as one of the best options for unparented children as it demands no resources 
from developing countries and bring new resources into the developing countries 
through fees and charity work. She, thus, criticizes those who interpret the subsidiarity 
principle to stifle intercountry adoptions arguing that they resolve the regimes’ 
provisions in favor of state sovereignty as opposed to the child’s right to a family 
(Gibbons & Rotabi, 2012). Smolin argues against Bartholet’s position stating that, a 
child’s family is much more than just the parents as it also includes the extended family 
network. He argues that, in most cases, favoring intercountry adoption ignores the 
broader connection of children not only with their parents, but also with the cultural, 
linguistic and societal groups, to which the children belong. This, he argues, might have 
devastating consequences on children. He thus resolves the subsidiarity principle in 
favor of states sovereignty and duty to provide care for children, who may lose their 
families, insisting that, intercountry adoption must be a measure of last resort after all 
possible in-country options have been exhausted. (Ibid.)  
 
The marketization debate 
The marketization debate in ICA was generated by the most cited but heavily criticized 
article ‘The economics of the baby shortage’ from 1978. The article was written by 
leading figures in law and economics Posner & Landes and its argument has since been 
supported by scholars such as Goodwin6. In the article the authors apply economic laws 
and framework to study the pros and cons in adoption and the matching mechanisms. 
They propose an evaluation of the efficiency of adoption through a market analysis and 
                                                          
3
 Professor of law at Harvard Law School and adoptive mother of two. 
4
 Professor of law at Cumberland School of Law in Alabama and adoptive father. 
5
 Subsidiarity principle: “Subsidiarity” in the Convention means that Contracting States recognise that 
a child should be raised by his or her birth family or extended family whenever possible. If that is not 
possible or practicable, other forms of permanent care in the State of origin should be considered. 
Only after due consideration has been given to national solutions should intercountry adoption be 
considered, and then only if it is in the child’s best interests. As a general rule, institutional care should 
be considered as a last resort for a child in need of a family.” 
(HCCH(b), 1993:1) 
6
 Professor in Law at University of Minnesota  
Page 12 of 65 
 
have been heavily criticized thereof with opponents arguing that, it would turn children 
into objects of mechanical economic analysis (Goodwin, 2006). Whereas Posner and 
Landes argue for a free market approach in ICA, Radin7 and others insist that, such an 
approach would have the effect of endangering the ‘personhood’ of the children involved. 
Radin argues that “In the worst case, market rhetoric could create a commodified self-
conception in everyone, as the result of commodifying every attribute that differentiates 
us and that other people value in us, and could destroy personhood as we know it” 
(Radin, 1987:1926). This demonstrates how the contestation of ICA is also shown in the 
different perspectives of different sciences e.g. the perspective of law versus the 
perspective of economics.  
 
The international legal framework in ICA 
Another important part of the literature is found within the international regulative 
framework guiding ICA. Especially the following international declarations and 
conventions are important to ICA and to this project:  
 The United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the 
Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement 
and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally (1986) (UND)  
The UND sets out the main concerns as to ensure adequate counseling of 
participants in and professional observation of the relationship between the 
child and the prospective adoptive parents before the adoption takes place. “The 
declaration, moreover, stresses on prevention of abduction and improper 
financial gain, as well as protection of the child’s legal and social interests” 
(UNICEF, 1998: 4). 
 
 The United Nations Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC)(1989) 
The CRC, just like the UND, opposes ICA resulting in improper financial gain for 
those involved and sale of children. For instance, Article 35 provides that “States 
Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to 
prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in 
any form”. Fundamental is the requirement that, the adoption should be in “the 
best interest of the child” (CRC, 1989: art. 21d & 35). 
 
                                                          
7
 Professor in Law at University of Michigan Law School 
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 The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (HCCH) (1998) 
The HCCH was designed principally to set up a mechanism for international 
cooperation to give practical effect to the CRC provisions relating to ICA. The 
HCCH just like the other two instruments discussed above have clearly 
unambiguous provisions related to making ICA a purely non-profit activity. 
Indeed since the convention was principally designed to give practical effect to 
provisions relating to ICA, its provisions on removing all market forces and 
profiteering incentives – the main reasons for the establishment of ICA Regimes, 
are very elaborate and extensive (HCCH, 1998: art. 4c,3; 4d, 4; 8;  11 & 32). 
 
Discernible from all three ICA instruments discussed above are clear and elaborate 
provisions meant to deal with the market forces and profiteering tendencies that had 
inundated ICA prior to the coming of these international regulative structures into force. 
 
The academic significance of the project 
As observed earlier, ICA has not gained prominence in GPE. However, by applying a 
Polanyi-perspective we discern more from the literature on child adoption than mere 
legal and psychosocial issues. We thus contend that, intercountry adoption goes beyond 
cooperative agreements among nations and also the field of International Relations. The 
inherent issues are not only sociological, psychological and legal, but also GPE elements 
and concepts, such as commodification, globalization, marketization and financial issues, 
manifest in intercountry adoption. We will elaborate further on this in the analysis. 
We see the academic significance of our project as rooted in inter alia our analysis of the 
economic and financial dimensions of ICA and the effects of globalization on the 
fictitious commodification of children in ICA. Based on the already mentioned GPE lack 
of focus on ICA, we believe that, our work could provoke further research into the 
economic, financial and (fictitious) commodification underpinning ICA and hopefully 
pave way for it to be studied in Global Political Economy. 
1.4 Delimitation 
The focus of the report is inherently within the scope of global political economy. 
Accordingly, the report will not deal with the normative and psychological issues of ICA. 
Hence, we will not involve in this work the debate on whether or not ICA serves 
children’s wellbeing or whether marketization of children is wrong.  
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In order to understand and analyze how receiving and sending states cooperate in ICA 
we may need to involve ourselves with certain issues that relate to International 
Relations e.g. Regime theory will be used for analysis of market regulation but not 
states’ behavior and role in international relations. However, our focus will remain that 
of GPE as we see that the emphasis on markets and globalization within GPE will add 
depth to the debate on intercountry adoption and international legal regimes - the focus 
of the project.  
1.5 Reading guide  
After the introduction to the project we are now going to present the structure of the 
project. The subsequent part will provide an overview of the methodology of the project 
including the problem statement, the research questions and the methods we are 
applying. Then we present our theory and the concepts that are relevant to our project 
i.e. globalization and ICA, children as commodities and, social entrepreneurship. This 
will lead on to our analysis, which will progress from market features, to stakeholders, 
to Regimes and, finally we are going to link the market features in ICA with the Regimes. 
In the final part of the report, we conclude on our findings and suggest what further 
research could be appropriate based on these. 
2. Methodology 
The following chapter contains a presentation of our problem statement and our 
research questions. After this we will present our research design and provide a 
discussion of and argumentation for the choice of methods applied to deliver a thorough 
answer to the problem statement.  
2.1 Problem statement 
With the aim of furthering an understanding of the issues raised above, the problem 
statement of this report is: 
 
Why is there a market in ICA, despite the international regulative regimes?  
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2.1.1 Research questions    
To answer the problem stated, we are going to analyze the following research questions, 
as each of them deal with different aspects of it:  
1) What market features are inherent in ICA?  
2) Which stakeholders are involved in the ICA market and how do they benefit from it? 
3) What is the role of the CRC & the HCCH in ICA? 
4) How do international legal regimes relate to ICA market? 
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2.2 Research design 
 
2.3 Process tracing 
Although contemporary researchers (especially qualitative researchers) are increasingly 
making use of process tracing for their studies, its meaning is still highly contested 
within the academic circle. In spite of the contestations on its definition, scholars 
generally agree that, “process tracing methods are arguably the only method that allows 
us to study causal mechanisms” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013:1).   
Process tracing enables researchers to make strong within-case causal inferences about 
causal mechanisms based on in-depth single-case studies (Ibid.). In this report, we make 
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use of process tracing as our method. The applicability of this method to our report is 
evidenced by not only the fact that our study is qualitative in nature, but also given that, 
we seek to examine a “cause” – why market forces prevail in ICA in spite of the regimes. 
As submitted by Beach & Pedersen, “the essence of process-tracing is to go beyond 
merely identifying correlated variables and outcomes” (Ibid.: 1).  
In this study, although we see a correlation between the factors8 that influence the 
demand and supply of adoptable children in the ICA market, we go beyond these factors 
to examine how underlying factors such as baby valuing, disparities in adoption service 
charges (pricing), preference for intercountry adoption to domestic (on the part of 
prospective adoptees and adoption agencies), reinforce and sustain the ICA market.   
We are confident that, by our use of process-tracing, we would be able to make strong 
within-case inferences and provide causal explanations to why market still exists in ICA, 
in spite of the regimes.  
Within the social science literature, process tracing is grouped into three main variants: 
theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome:  
 The theory-testing variant “deduces a theory from the existing literature and 
then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesized casual 
mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within-case inference about 
whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the 
mechanism as a whole was present” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 3). 
 
 The theory-building variant “seeks to build a generalizable theoretical 
explanation from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general casual 
mechanism exists from the facts of a particular case” (Ibid.). 
 
 The process-tracing method of explaining-outcome “aims not to build or test 
more general theories but to craft a (minimal) sufficient explanation of the 
outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case-centric than theory-
oriented” (Ibid.).  
                                                          
8
 Low fertility rates in developed North coupled with strict regulation of domestic adoption processes 
on one hand, and high fertility rates in less developed South coupled with high levels of poverty on 
the other hand. (See part on History of ICA). 
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We find our work aligned to the third variant: explaining-outcome, given that, we 
purpose to provide an explanation for why market still exists in the respective case we 
are investigating namely, intercountry adoption.   
2.4. Data collection 
We are using secondary internet research on existing empirical data in order to locate 
and access bibliographic materials available online such as journals, newspaper articles, 
official documents, library databases and so on. We engage in an explorative data 
collecting strategy followed by an extensive snowball sampling strategy to guide us to 
the most cited and debated writings on different elements of our research statement.  
This will provide us with a relevant and broad perspective on the legislative and 
regulative aspect of ICA as well as contemporary market argumentations made about 
ICA. The techniques and procedures we make use of in our online data collection are e.g. 
document analysis of static online documents, which have been placed on the internet 
for the purpose of dissemination. (Hewson & Laurant, 2008). 
A large percentage of our data is related to and comes from sources in the US. The 
reason for this is that US is the largest receiving country and accounts for more than half 
the number of the children being adopted through ICA each year. Also ‘the case’ of US 
differs from that of other receiving countries as it has a more liberal adoption market. 
Besides the data from the US we draw on examples and literature from various other 
receiving and sending countries, primarily Denmark, Russia, Guatemala and Ethiopia as 
these are also some of the dominant actors in ICA.  
 
Advantages and pitfalls 
Some of the advantages, of collecting data through internet inquiry or secondary 
internet research, are, that it is cost-effective and provide access to large volumes of 
data (Ibid.). This, however, is also related to one of the most common pitfalls of using 
this method as the vast volumes of data requires a thorough verification and 
authentication of source information in order to uphold the credibility and reliability of 
the research (Ibid.). We seek to reduce (it may not be possible to entirely eliminate) this 
problem of credibility of information by relying extensively on data from state 
departments and reputable NGOs and International Organizations such as UNICEF. 
Another pitfall is the updating or entire changeability of the internet information which 
challenges the long-term access to same data. This requires frequent checking of the 
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links used in the collection of data and making sure, that hard copies of the data is 
available for scrutiny (Ibid.). To ensure this problem of changeability of information, we 
have appropriately referenced all information cited in this report by stating clearly the 
year of publication and where necessary the specific pages that contain that 
information.  
2.5 Empirical data 
2.5.1 Analysis of documents 
In order to gain insight into historical, political, social, economic, and other dimensions 
of our field of research we are using the qualitative method of document analysis.  In 
doing so we focus on the content of the documents and the way they communicate their 
focus or standpoint. 
According to Prior (2008) “(…) each and every document enters into human activity in a 
dual relation. First, documents enter the social field as receptacles (of instructions, 
obligations, contracts, wishes, reports, etc.). Second, they enter the field as agents in 
their own right, and as agents documents have effects long after their human creators 
are dead and buried (e.g., wills, testaments)” (Prior, 2008:231). Furthermore, we are 
aware that documents are subjected to manipulation by others i.e. in the form of 
alliances, resources for further action or opponents, and we will take this into 
consideration, when analyzing different documents for the research, by juxtaposing 
such documents to opposing views within that scholarly debate (Ibid.).  
 There are several ways to go about document analysis - one of the most used being 
content analysis. Beside content analysis, notions of grounded theory, thematic coding 
schemes and discourse analysis have also been used to do in-depth analysis of writings 
(Ibid.). However, in this report, we make use of content analysis.  
 
Content analysis 
Content analysis is the “(...) process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters 
of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and 
relationships between variables or themes” (Julien,2008: 121). 
In document analysis the analysis of content is a way to reduce data and to make sense 
of it. We engage with content analysis knowing that a text is always open to subjective 
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interpretation. We also recognize that it reflects multiple meanings and that it is indeed 
context dependent, thus being part of a larger discourse. 
According to Julien (2008), content analysis can help reveal how content is often subject 
related. She explains how, “(...) by applying content analysis to official reports and 
policies of an organization; such an analysis may identify the stated priorities of that 
organization as well as reveal implicit political perspectives” (Ibid.). This will help us 
reveal both intentional and unintentional messages communicated by different texts.  
As with all research methods validity and reliability are key concerns when doing 
content analysis. This can be done by “conducting iterative analyses, seeking negative or 
contradictory examples, seeking confirmatory data through methodological 
triangulation, and providing supporting examples for conclusions drawn” (Ibid.). We 
will, thus, seek to uphold the trustworthiness and credibility of our research by 
engaging in the abovementioned whenever possible and necessary. 
The key documents analyzed and used in this project include: the 1998 issue of The 
Innocenti Digest by UNICEF on intercountry adoption, compiled by Nigel Cantwell and 
published at the UNICEF website; the provisions contained in the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (referred to as CRC in this report) and the 1993 Convention on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (also 
referred to as the Hague convention and HCCH in this report). 
2.5.2 Critique of empirical data 
Our study primarily hinges on document analysis.  Therefore it may be argued that, our 
report can be skewed given that, authors of documents on especially a highly politicized 
issue such as intercountry adoption might use them to promote their position, interest 
and ideas, hence being biased. Second, we may not be able to thoroughly examine the 
finances involved in ICA, because of e.g. non-availability or lack of transparency in the 
budgets and financial statements of adoption agencies.  
However, to reduce the tendencies of biases, we would incorporate opposing views so as 
to have a representation of the different shades of opinion on intercountry adoption. 
Again we would rely on documents authored by reputable institutions and scholars in 
the field whose research findings and arguments have stood the test of time and peer 
reviews.  
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On the finances, whilst we rely on the information provided by the adoption agencies, 
we would also make use of those that are provided by central state institutions and 
agencies, and “independent” international organizations to be able to capture 
adequately the financial exchanges in ICA.  
3. Theory and conceptualization 
3.1 Perspectives on market 
Historian Fernand Braudel in his work Civilization and Capitalism, 15th and 18th Century 
made an attempt to identify and draw the picture of markets from around the world. He 
came to the conclusion that it is not possible to capture the essentials of all markets in 
one theory. Based on his findings, he openly criticized other scholars who attempted to 
apply the same explanation on various types of market (Neil & Swedberg, 1994). In the 
forthcoming part we will, however, try to summarize some of the most prominent 
perspectives on markets in order to locate certain market features that can guide our 
analysis of the market in ICA. 
3.1.1. Economic and social economic perspectives 
The market is one of the most important concepts that have been applied in the 
economic neoclassical theories and political economy. According to these theories, 
market is defined by what it does, more particularly by its allocative and pricing 
function (Rosenbaum, 2000). Swedberg argues that classical economists saw the market 
as synonymous either with a market place or a geographical area (Neil & Swedberg 
1994). Despite the fact that neoclassical economists have broadly used the notion of 
market, it is difficult to trace the discussion on the phenomenon of market. The reason 
for this is that most writings are focusing on the market as a determination mechanism 
for prices. Barber’s explanation of this crucial absence was that “the concept of market 
was implied rather than explicitly discussed” (Smelser & Swedberg, 1994:257). 
 However, Marshall introduced the concept of market drawing on the definition by 
Cournot and Jevons, who identified market by supply and demand as the underlying 
principles. As Cournot expressed, “Economists understand the term market not as any 
particular place in which things are bought and sold, but the whole of any region in 
which buyers and sellers are in such intercourse with one another that the prices of the 
same goods tend to equality easily and quickly” (emphasis added) (Cournot & Jevons 
cited in Marshall, 1936:324). Also, Jevons expressed that, “originally a market was a 
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public place in a town where provisions and other objects were exposed for sale; but the 
word has been generalized, so as to mean anybody or persons who are in intimate 
business relations and carry on extensive transactions in any commodity” (Ibid.). 
Along with the neoclassical economic thoughts, market has gained attention in economic 
sociology, which has tried to uncover the social structure of the phenomenon. 
“Sociologists have suggested new ways of conceptualizing how market operates in social 
terms” (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005:234).  However, the lack of cooperation between 
economists and sociologists has led to the creation, as Schumpeter puts it, of ‘primitive 
sociology’ and ‘primitive economics’ (Ibid.:243).  
One of the early attempts to analyze the market from classical sociological theory was 
made by Weber, whose main interest was the interaction between market and society. 
He also emphasizes the role of power struggle between market parties, which results in 
monetary pricing (Ibid.). In contrast to other neoclassicists, Marx introduced the social 
dimension in price and value, explaining that the value was not inherent in a commodity, 
but rather “a relation between persons expressed as a relation between things” (Ibid.: 
258). Smelser & Swedberg argue that “the way that economists spoke about prices, 
however, fed the illusion that values were not created by people but somehow 
constituted qualities of the objects themselves. A peculiar “merchandise fetishism” 
resulted, Marx said, in which people projected life unto objects because they did not 
understand that they themselves had created those values through their own work” 
(Smelser & Swedberg, 2005:258).   
Contemporary economic sociologists embrace the embeddedness approach to the 
market. Granovetter, White and Burt claim that “social relations are fundamental to 
market forces”. This approach is inspired by Karl Polanyi’s work and ideas on market 
nature, i.e. he argues that "the human economy...is embedded and enmeshed in 
institutions, economic and noneconomic” (Polanyi cited in Lie, 1997:348). The principle 
of embeddedness promotes the idea that “social networks - build on kinship or 
friendship, trust or goodwill - sustain economic relation and institution” (Lie, 1997:349).  
Taking into account the contested nature of the market concept and the absence of a 
concrete definition of a market among a multiplicity of scholars and disciplines, we rely 
on the aforementioned views on the market as we focus on what constitutes a market. 
We rely on the work by the neoclassical economic trio of Marshall, Cournot and Jevons 
in our view that the market strongly relates to the concept of exchange and is defined by 
the existence of supply and demand, value and price, commodification, and market agents 
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(buyers and sellers). Furthermore the economic sociological approach of embeddedness 
and the ideas of Karl Polanyi on social nature of market will serve as an overall 
theoretical umbrella for understanding the concept of the market.  
The next section will provide an overview of scholars and their claims, that the 
aforementioned features of the market can be traced in ICA and therefore prove the 
existence of a market in ICA.   
3.1.2 ICA as a market 
Several scholars such as Posner, Goodwin and Smolin explore the financial 
considerations that are often involved in adoption e.g. “baby valuing”. They also suggest 
that those transactions illustrate the market nature of adoptions in the United States 
(Goodwin, 2010:3). Goodwin (2006) seeks to unveil a ‘market consciousness’ in the 
adoption process, arguing that “economic interests influence adoption more than we 
might like to acknowledge” (Goodwin, 2006:63). She also demonstrates that, the 
adoption process is more like a market than less so and she frames the adoption market 
debate, arguing that current adoption indeed resembles a free market. Goodwin 
analyzes current adoption processes in the United States, “which are governed by 
factors of availability, race, class, and aesthetic preferences” (Goodwin, 2006:63). 
Notwithstanding the competing views on the essential elements of the market concept, 
issues like exchange, demand and supply, value and price, and commodification 
consistently feature in most scholarly views on the market. We therefore excuse 
ourselves from the unending theoretical debate on market, and apply ourselves to the 
dimensions of the market. These dimensions are indeed evident in ICA processes 
sustaining the existence of “improper financial gains” and “payments” in clear breach of 
the international regulative framework in ICA.  
Drawing on the abovementioned approaches to the market and, the market dimensions 
in ICA demonstrated by Goodwin, the following market criteria will be applied later on 
in our analysis of the inherent market features in ICA: 
 The existence of demand and supply and the willingness to exchange 
 Frequent financial transactions among adoptive parents, birth mothers, and 
adoption agencies that resemble payments 
 Price differentiation tendencies & market segmentation, the differences in the 
fees due to race, gender, and health  
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 Social valuing 
 Commodification 
 Market agents 
3.2 Polanyi’s perspective on market 
In this section we add further to our understanding of the market concept by presenting 
Polanyi’s view of the market and the notion of fictitious commodities. Furthermore, 
Polanyi has a significant role for our research in order to understand the regulation of 
the ICA market. 
Polanyi defines market as “a meeting place for the purpose of barter or buying and 
selling” (Polanyi, 2001:59). He argues that market is so crucial that, “no society could, 
naturally, live for any length of time unless it possessed a [market] economy of some 
sort” (Ibid.: 45). Polanyi argues that the institution of market has been with human 
beings even during the Stone Age and that market is needed to ensure “order in the 
production and distribution of goods” (Ibid.: 74). Thus markets have been and continues 
to be central to our existence; without which, economic life would not have been 
possible.   
As mentioned above, Polanyi’s perspective on market is based on the idea of market 
embeddedness (see Economic and social economic perspectives on market). Since one of 
the main underlying concepts in the market definition is exchange and commodification, 
we ought to explore the key Polanyian concept of fictitious commodities. 
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi defined “commodities as objects produced for sale 
on the market” (Polanyi, 1971:72). Polanyi noted that things of nature and life such as 
land and labor (workers/human beings) “are obviously not commodities” (Ibid.) and 
therefore are not to be subjected to the mechanisms of the market. He thus cautions 
“(…) labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which every 
society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the 
market mechanisms means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of 
the market” (Polanyi, 1971:71). Accordingly, Polanyi describes the commodity 
description of labor and land in the market economy as “entirely fictitious” because 
“none of them is produced for sale” (Ibid.: 72).  
The discussed relation between fictitious commodities and the market leads to the 
understanding of the key idea that underlines Polanyi’s perspective on market, namely 
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the necessity of market regulation. Despite Polanyi’s acknowledgment of how 
fundamental the market is to the organization of human economic life, he argues that, if 
left unregulated, its impact on society and human life would be very precarious. He thus 
argues that, “the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia [and that] such an 
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and 
natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed 
his surroundings into a wilderness” (Polanyi, 2001:3). 
Polanyi states that, a self-adjusting market is “controlled, regulated, and directed by 
market prices [and that] an economy of this kind [would push] human beings to behave 
in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains” (Ibid.: 71). Polanyi adds that, in such 
an economy, production will then be controlled by prices, for the profits of those who 
direct production will depend upon them; the distribution of the goods also will depend 
upon prices, for prices form incomes, and it is with the help of these incomes that the 
goods produced [would be] distributed amongst the members of society” (Ibid.).  
Thus when market is left unregulated or in a self-regulating market, “production and 
distribution of goods” would be controlled by “prices alone” and would therefore imply 
“that all production is for sale on the market” (Ibid.: 72).  Polanyi argues that, such a self-
regulating market controlled by prices would be injurious because it would subject 
human beings, society and its natural surroundings to its mechanisms by fictitiously 
commodifying things otherwise not produced for sale (Ibid.). 
However, market forces have the capacity to subject to its mechanisms human and 
natural substances and, this is the reason, Polanyi argues, for the “measures” that 
society takes “to protect itself” from the market (Polanyi, 2001:3). Thus market needs to 
be regulated by states. The idea of the establishment of international market regimes by 
states is to protect the global world from the negative effects of a self- regulating market.  
It is therefore in view of the precarious tendencies of powerful market forces on 
intercountry adoption that the ICA Regimes were made to control the ICA market from 
subjecting human elements to the price mechanisms within it.  
3.3 Regime Theory 
As indicated above we see markets as socially constructed and, relying on Polanyi’s 
view, we suggest that there is a need to regulate markets, such as the one in ICA. One 
way to regulate markets is by the creation of international regulative frameworks or 
regimes to control the behavior of states and other actors involved in a market. In the 
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forthcoming part we are going explain the key ideas and understandings in Regime 
Theory, which we are later going to apply to our analysis of regimes in ICA.    
Little observed that, the existence of “international rules predate the emergence of the 
modern state” (Little, 2008:298). In addition to this understanding Schwartz evidences 
that, as far back as the end of the Second World War, US championed the establishment 
of a complex array of economic regimes which led to the strengthening of global finance, 
trade and investments (Schwartz, 2010).  In the world today, it appears that, there is no 
area of international discourse devoid of regimes – states are now circumscribed by the 
existence of several mutually accepted sets of rules of activities. Thus states are 
enmeshed in an increasingly complex set of rules and institutions. Several regimes are 
embedded in the world system to the extent that we actually take them for granted – i.e. 
regimes on global security, environment, economy, communication and postal services 
and other facets of global activities (Little, 2008).  
The calls for international regimes, Evans and Wilson argue, have been exacerbated by 
the increasing global problems such as environmental degradation, resource depletion, 
security and problems associated with the spread of scientific and technological 
knowledge (Evans & Wilson, 1992). Thus to illustrate, whereas globalization and 
technology has for instance made it possible to easily see and talk to people on the other 
side of the globe, it has also made it possible to build weapons with the potential to 
wreak global devastation and to pollute the atmosphere irreversibly. As noted by Little, 
“[global] survival depends upon our capacity to regulate global activity by means of 
regimes” (Little, 2008: 301).  
Deliberating on “regimes”, Krasner advanced that, they constitute “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 
1983, cited in Little, 2008:300). Stated differently, regimes are what Evans & Wilson call 
“management structures” developed to contain the “[globalized] accelerating rate of 
change, which [has] threatened to overwhelm humankind’s capacity to respond to new 
economic, social and political conditions” (Evans & Wilson, 1992:330).  
Generally, regimes are associated with highly formalized agreements or even the 
emergence of international organizations. However, at the other extreme, Little argues 
that, regimes can come into existence “even in the absence of any formal agreements” 
(Little, 2008:301). Thus, in examining regimes, the presence or absence of formal or 
informal rules is not all that important, but the extent to which parties/states expect or 
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anticipate that, their behavior will be constrained by their accession to an implicit or 
explicit set of agreements is the fundamental issue. Howbeit, whichever way regimes 
may be looked at, the point that International Regimes are a product of rational self-
interested actors/states meant to govern a wide range of global activities cannot be 
deemphasized. Examples of such International Regimes are the regimes that regulate 
intercountry adoption.  
Mayer & Rittberger, (1997) and Hasenclever, (2000) argue that, classifying regime 
theory into Liberalism and Realism leads to oversimplification. However, as poignantly 
insisted by Little, these two schools of thought “allow us to trace the broad parameters 
precipitated by the attempts to understand regimes” (Little, 2008: 298). Increasingly, 
International Relations literatures appear narrowing the evolution of the regimes theory 
to these two broad schools of thought – Realism and Liberalism (Ibid.). 
Before we discuss their contending approaches about the evolution of regimes it must 
be noted that, both schools acknowledge that, although the international system is 
anarchic (without a ruler) in structure, it has never been anomic (without rules). Again, 
they both concede that, regimes are an important feature of contemporary international 
relations and they also start from the same theoretical premise that a regime represents 
the response of rational actors operating within the anarchic structure of the 
international system (Ibid.). Where they part ways, is in their assessments of regimes – 
how it is formed, what facilitates and what inhibits it and, the role of power in regime 
formation.   
3.3.1 Liberalism or Liberal Institutional approach   
Liberal Institutionalists see the anarchic global system as an equivalent of a perfect 
competitive market where there is no centralized institutions that externally interfere in 
rational economic actors’ pursuit of their self-interested strategies. Thus within the 
international system, as happens in a perfect market, there is no global equivalent of the 
state in existence to enact legislation compelling sovereign states to subscribe to a 
common policy (Little, 2008).  
As pertains in microeconomics where market failure leads to less production of “public 
goods” and even in circumstances, where unrestrained market competitions produce 
“public bads”, in the international system, according to Liberal Institutionalists, 
unrestrained “competitive” actions of sovereign states are the cause of the widespread 
global problems like global pollution, resource depletion, arms races and trade barriers. 
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Relying on microeconomic analysis again, Liberal Institutionalists argue that, like at the 
market place, in the international system, sometimes actors/states need to rather 
collaborate than compete (Ibid.).  
But rational states fail to pursue collaborative strategies because they expect the other 
members of the anarchic global system to pursue competitive strategies. For instance, 
(in helping to reduce global arms conflict), no state will stop producing arms; if it 
believes that the other states intend to produce or are producing arms. Thus states are 
inhibited from moving to collaborative strategies by their expectation that other states 
would defect. There is therefore the need to identify a mechanism that would convince 
all actors that, there is no danger of defection. Liberal Institutionalists believe that the 
establishment of regimes provides evidence that mechanisms of this kind must exist. 
Thus the consequent problems of anarchy are avertable by regime formation (Ibid.).  
Liberalism provides two different routes on what facilitates the emergence of regimes: 
First, the presence of a “hegemon” in the international arena. They support this position 
with examples like the 19th century regime which successfully outlawed international 
traffic of slaves. They argue that, states agreed to observe the humanitarian principle 
underpinning that regime because they expected other states to do so. The expectation 
according to them emerged because it was recognized that Great Britain intended to 
police the regime and possessed the naval capacity to do so. The regime was therefore 
consolidated because of Britain’s hegemonic status within the international system 
(Little, 2008). Also Schwartz indicated that, the economic regimes (IMF, The World 
Bank, the OECD and the GATT9) established after the Second World War owe their 
existence to the presence of the United States as the then hegemon (Schwartz, 2010).  
  The second route explored by the Liberal Institutionalists arises from their analysis of 
the consequences of hegemonic decline. They conclude that, even in such instance, 
established regimes would still persist “if all states can be persuaded to do the same 
[thing]” (Little, 2008:305). They hereby clarify their earlier position and argue that “the 
major mechanism for establishing and maintaining a regime is not the existence of a 
hegemon but the principle of reciprocity” (Ibid.)  
Liberal Institutionalists have therefore increasingly come to focus on factors that 
strengthen reciprocity within the international system. They emphasize for instance 
                                                          
9
 We are aware that these regimes have had different names throughout the years, but have chosen 
to use the actual names for the ease of the reading. 
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that, inspection and surveillance facilities are important for ensuring that states operate 
within the parameters of a regime (Ibid.).  
3.3.2 The Realist approach  
Realists are often skeptical of or uninterested in international law, yet they have 
developed an important position on regimes. Unsurprisingly though, Realists contest the 
Liberal Institutional approach by firstly rejecting the claim that, there could be a 
hegemon who would act in the interest of public good (Little, 2008). So in the case of the 
economic regimes championed by the US after the Second World War (see Schwartz, 
2010 supra), the Realists would deny that the US helped to enact the regimes in the 
interest of global finance, trade and investment.  
In their view, the US rather ensured that, those “regimes were underpinned by a 
particular set of principles and norms” that promote and sustain “its own long-term 
interest” (Ibid.: 305). This position of Realists becomes more forceful when one 
juxtaposes it against Schwartz observation that, “domestic political compromises 
determined the form and content of US hegemony” (Schwartz, 2010:192). Secondly, they 
deny Liberal Institutionalists claim that regimes emerge as a result of states 
endeavoring to overcome the pressure to compete under conditions of anarchy. On the 
contrary, they posit that, “regimes form, in situations when uncoordinated strategies 
interact to produce sub-optimum outcomes” (Little, 2008:305). Realists argue that 
states wishing to form a regime do not confront the problem of collaboration (as 
advanced by Institutional Liberalism) but coordination (Ibid.). Realists thus link the 
emergence of Regimes to situations where there is a mutual desire to cooperate, but 
where anarchy generates a problem of coordination.  
Accordingly, in clear opposition to Liberal Institutionalists, Realists hold that, “the 
problem is not associated with the danger of defection to a competitive strategy, but the 
possibility of failing to coordinate strategies, with the consequence that a mutually 
desired goal [would be] unintentionally missed” (Little, 2008:306). This principle 
underwrites Realists argument that states would still adhere to principles and norms 
underlying a regime that they oppose. In their view, this problem of coordination is not 
addressable by the principle of reciprocity but through communication.  
To illustrate, the French may be aversive to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s rule that every pilot and some personnel in every air traffic control 
center must be able to speak English. Yet they have no option than to persist with the 
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policy because the consequence of coordination – the use of English is preferable to the 
alternative that would arise in the event of a failure to coordinate. Thus it would be 
desirable for the French to persist with the use of English to ensure the safety of air 
flights than to have accidents due to communication problems – failure to coordinate is 
less advantageous (Ibid.).   
Realists’ views on power and regime also differ widely from Liberal Institutionalists. As 
demonstrated already, Liberal Institutionalists argue that power may be used by a 
hegemon to pressure other states to collaborate and conform to the regime. Realists 
deny this and argue on the other hand that power plays a crucial role in the 
international system but “not as a threat to discipline states caught defecting from 
collaborative agreement” (Little, 2008:308). To the Realists, power is rather used in the 
bargaining process “to determine the shape of a regime around which all states will 
coordinate their actions” (Ibid.) 
In spite of the competing claims of the Liberal Institutional and Realists approaches, as 
demonstrated earlier, they all concede that, regimes are an important feature of 
contemporary international relations and are necessary for the regulation of the 
anarchic international system. It is the utmost need for regimes to govern global 
activities that have led to the establishment of several international regimes among 
nation states in the world.  
3.4 Conceptualization 
In this part we set out to conceptualize some of the most prominent ideas in this project. 
This will therefore serve as points of reference when we engage with the concepts 
throughout the report.   
3.4.1 Globalization and intercountry adoption 
The discipline Global Political Economy is beleaguered with a lot of contestations as to 
what really the subject concerns itself about (Palan, 2012). One of the most vehemently 
debated topics in GPE is, perhaps, whether “the world is ‘truly’ affected by 
[globalization]” or “globalization is just “an idea” (Bruff, 2005:261). Bruff captures the 
contestation about globalization in GPE in this way:  
When it comes to political economy analysis, the word ‘globalization’ hangs over 
every debate like an immovable, dark cloud. Whether we believe that the world is 
‘truly’ affected by the cloud’s presence or not depends on our position, but it 
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cannot be denied that even as an idea ‘globalization’ influences the way research 
is conducted (Bruff, 2005:261). 
Thus, whether viewed as “an idea” or “real”, most GPE literature acknowledge that 
globalization has and continues to have tremendous impact on human lives and 
contemporary political economy analysis (Ibid.).   
An aspect of human live that has been highly shaped by globalization is our 
consumption patterns. Heightened consumerism as a result of globalization has turned 
the world into a consumer driven society or economy. We are now experiencing a 
deepening of particular tastes and desires, and extensive commodification of tastes, 
pleasure and leisure leading to “commodification of [even] the lifeworld” (Peterson, 
2005:515). For instance, as noted by Peterson, nowadays, “adoptable children, 
sexualized bodies and sensual pleasures are for sale, based on gendered assumptions 
regarding the ‘need to mother’, the male ‘sex drive’, and whose pleasures are prioritized 
(Ibid.). This is how we see that ICA is highly related to the effects of globalization. 
Another aspect of globalization that affects ICA is found in advancement in technology. 
Today adoption agencies effectively use social media and the internet for marketization 
and advertising their services and “products” by creating awareness among childless 
adults, marketing ICA and promoting services through social media and internet10 and, 
assessing “fees” for services (Adamec & Miller, 2007). We therefore argue that not only 
has ICA been influenced by globalization, heightened consumerism and advancement in 
technology - the market in ICA has also changed considerably because of this. 
3.4.2 Children as commodities 
Although article 1 of the CRC clearly defines a child as “a person below the age of 18, 
unless the law of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger” (CRC, 
1989) the conception of childhood is highly contested.  Watson argues that, the concept 
of childhood as contested relies on its historical, cultural and legal implications.  This is 
demonstrated in the inconsistency that exists between states. Furthermore 
“inconsistencies can also occur with regard to what constitutes a child within the 
national context” (Watson 2004:4). Watson draws on the example of  the United 
Kingdom, where “the paradox remains that someone can marry, but not buy the 
champagne to celebrate that marriage; or join the army but not be able to vote for the 
government whose policies will ultimately command that army” (Watson 2004:5). 
                                                          
10
 I.e. internet photolisting and videotaping of children available for adoption 
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Watson argues that, “such inconsistencies can only confuse the legal standing of 
measures, designed to protect children and impede efforts to institutionalize the 
potential rights and responsibilities assigned to them” (Ibid.). 
The debate on whether or not children should be seen as commodities prominently 
feature in the discussion of ICA. There are a great number of scholars who argue that 
children are not and should not be seen as commodities. They claim that it’s immoral 
and fear that it might lead to “impoverished selfhood, compromised interaction, and the 
destruction of things in which people invest individuality and by which they create 
meanings” (Schultz,1997:1942). Another group of scholars argue that, although it might 
be immoral, the fact is that money is involved in intercountry adoption and children are 
in fact commodities as there is a market for them, driven by the forces of demand and 
supply. They therefore argue that, we have to take this into consideration when we talk 
about and legislate on intercountry adoption (Goodwin, 2006; Blackstone et. al 2004 & 
2008). 
Undeniably in ICA, children command prices and there is a market for them, yet, they 
cannot be properly construed as real commodities because, to all intents and purposes, 
children are not produced for sale. In this sense, we argue that, it can only be said that, 
children have been fictitiously commodified in ICA. We therefore draw on the writings of 
Polanyi in our understanding of children as (fictitious) commodities.  
3.4.3 Social entrepreneurship 
Since market agents play a significant role in the analysis of market, but at the same time 
adoption agencies claim to be not-for-profit, the concept of social entrepreneurship has 
been chosen to identify the interests pursued by ICA market agents.   
The concept of social entrepreneurship is quite new and was introduced in the late 
1980. Dees has explained its emergence by the contemporary tendencies in the relation 
between the commercial/economic and the social sector. He argues that the increased 
financial pressures on most organizations concerned with social issues forced 
government agencies and non-profit organizations to reinvent themselves to be more 
business-like. Drawing on the example of universities, he argues, that government’s 
struggle to balance the budget led to the decrease of government subsidies and forced 
many organizations in the social sector to search “for new ways to control costs, 
improve effectiveness, and increase revenues” (Dees & Elias, 1998:166).  
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In order to understand the concept of social entrepreneurship, it is clear that the notion 
of entrepreneur needs to be explored. Dees found that this notion has its origin in the 
work of French economist, Jean Baptiste Say, in 19th century, who defined it this way: 
“The entrepreneur shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of 
higher productivity and greater yield” (Say cited in Dees, 1998:1). Furthermore, 
Schumpeter pictured entrepreneurs as drivers of “creative-destructive process of 
capitalism” who reform the pattern of productivity and change economy “by exploiting 
an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new 
commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply 
of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on” 
(Schumpeter cited in Dees, 1998:1). Thus, as Dees argues, the Say-Schumpeter tradition 
has become a theoretical foundation for the concept and can be traced in many current 
theories of entrepreneurship.   
Since the concept of social entrepreneurship derives from the aforementioned views on 
entrepreneurship, it raises the question on what exactly makes social entrepreneurs 
‘social’. Dees sees social entrepreneurs as “one species in the genus entrepreneur, they 
are entrepreneurs with a social mission” (Dees, 1998:2). Commercial enterprise creates 
economic value through markets: “funds are raised in capital markets; employees are 
hired through labor markets; supplies are purchased and goods are sold in product 
markets (and) money is the central medium for exchange and the most commonly used 
measure of value creation” (Dees & Elias, 1998: 174). At the same time various degrees 
of commercialization can be traced among social entrepreneurs. Dees and Elias argue 
that “many social enterprises charge fees for their services, collect some contract 
revenues, employ paid staff and professionals, and raise capital from banks or through 
bond issues” (Ibid.:174). This demonstrates the absence of solid boundaries between 
social and commercial enterprises and raises the question on approval of the concept of 
social entrepreneurship.   
However, several scholars find the distinctive feature of social entrepreneurship in the 
motivation behind its activities. An analysis of Mair and Marti goes beyond the 
dichotomy of profit versus not-for-profit and they argue, “the main difference between 
entrepreneurship in the business sector and social entrepreneurship lies in the relative 
priority given to social wealth creation versus economic wealth creation. In business 
entrepreneurship, social wealth is a by-product of the economic value created; in social 
entrepreneurship, the main focus is on social value creation” (Mair & Marti, 2006:39). 
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Even though an attempt to distinguish social entrepreneurship by its motivation was 
made by several authors critique was raised on the subjectivity of the dimension of 
motivation and its usefulness for analysis. As Venkataraman argues ‘‘entrepreneurship 
is particularly productive from a social welfare perspective when, in the process of 
pursuing selfish ends, entrepreneurs also enhance social wealth by creating new 
markets, new industries, new technology, new institutional forms, new jobs, and net 
increases in real productivity’’ (Venkataraman cited in Mair & Marti, 2006:38). Thus 
“while the profit motive might be ‘‘a central engine’’ of entrepreneurship, it does not 
preclude other motivations” (Mair & Marti, 2006:38). At the same time, an “income 
[earning] strategy” and commercialization inherent for social entrepreneurship 
threatens its ability to serve its social mission (Dees & Elias, 1998:175).   
4. Analysis 
4.1 What market features are inherent in ICA? 
In this part we are going to focus on the market features within ICA. This will provide us 
with a solid foundation for analyzing the stakeholders in ICA and how they benefit, 
which we will do in the following part. 
As mentioned in the theory-part the concept of market is contested and hard to define. 
We, thus, focus our attention on specific features of markets that most scholars agree 
upon namely those of: exchange, demand and supply, value creation, preferences and 
pricing. Furthermore we analyze the notion of baby valuing in relation to race, gender 
and health and disparities in adoption service charges.  
 
Supply and demand 
As illustrated in the theory-part one of the most prominent features of markets is the 
mechanisms of supply and demand. Advocates of the free market would argue that the 
mechanisms of supply and demand is what drives the market and that these 
mechanisms if left unregulated will balance each other out and thereby create its own 
control mechanism of the market. In a regulated market the mechanisms of supply and 
demand are subjected to regulations but they are still present. This is why we, in this 
first part of the analysis, are focusing on the supply and demand mechanisms in ICA. 
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 As previously described there has been a steady increase in the number of children 
being adopted through ICA since 1948. However, in the years from 2000-2011, ICA 
witnessed both a dramatic increase and decrease in the number of children being 
adopted11, which can only be explained by mechanisms of supply and demand.   One of 
the main reasons for the decrease in the number of children adopted through ICA is a 
decrease in the supply of children from some of the top sending countries.  Guatemala is 
one such case where an attempt to change the national laws in order to meet the 
requirements of The HCCH was made in 2007 but overturned in 2008, which caused a 
dramatic decline in the adoptions from Guatemala to the United States. The number of 
adoptions thus reduced from 4,726 in 2007 to 754 in 2009 and as few as 7 in 2012 as 
the US maintains that, Guatemala has not yet fully implemented legislation that would 
create a Convention-compliant adoption process and therefore only adoptions that were 
filed before December 31, 2007 would be processed.  
Other major sending countries that have seen a decline in the number of children 
supplied for ICA are Russia and Ukraine. Whereas the case of Ukraine is related to an 
increased emphasis on in-country adoption and focus on family-based upbringing12, the 
case of Russia is a very different story. In Russia the decrease of children in ICA is highly 
related to the political relationship between US and Russia. An example of this is was in 
2009, where Russia threatened with a temporary suspension of adoptions to the US 
after Artyom Savelyev, a 7-year-old adopted child, was rejected by his American mother 
and sent back alone to Russia (Selman, 2012). In the aftermath of this, negotiations for a 
bilateral agreement on ICA between the US and Russia began. These negotiations were 
stalled several times because of differences of opinions on key issues but in November 
2011 the agreement finally came into force only to be cancelled by the Russian 
authorities a few months later as a result of political struggles between the US and 
Russia related to a completely different matter. The result of the political struggles 
between the US and Russia eventually caused Russian authorities to ban all adoptions 
by US parents from January 2013 and onwards which explains the dramatic fall in 
supply of Russian children in ICA as US was the largest receiving country for Russian 
children (Selman, 2012).  
                                                          
11
 In 1998 there were fewer than 32,000 adoptions; by 2004 this number had risen to over 45,000; by 
2009 the world total had fallen to under 30,000 – less than in 1998 – and the decline continued in 
2010 (Selman, 2012). 
12
 According to the President’s commissioner for children's rights Yuri Pavlenko, http://en.for-
ua.com/news/2013/09/30/131302.html 
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On the other side intercountry adoptions from Haiti doubled after the earthquake in 
January 2010, with as many as 1,223 children being adopted by US parents in 2010 
compared to 330 the year before and, a rise in ICAs to France from 651 in 2009 to 992 in 
2010 (Ibid.). Strangely, a year after the earthquake, the number of ICA dropped 
dramatically and less than 100 children from Haiti were adopted by US and French 
parents in 2011 (Selman, 2012).  
Given the analyzed developments in ICA one might argue that the recent declines in ICA 
over the past decade or so, has partially been offset by increases elsewhere. However a 
counter-argument to this is found in recent data suggesting that several adoption 
agencies within the US and Europe have shut down or merged with other agencies as a 
result of a fall in the supply of children available for ICA. According to Roelie Post13, the 
reason for the decrease in supply of children is the instant information provided by the 
internet on adoption cases that go wrong. This causes the sending countries to limit or 
in some cases ban all intercountry adoptions in order to prevent major scandals that 
could harm their reputation and recognition in the international society. At the same 
time the demand from parents wanting to adopt might also be decreasing. The reason 
for this is an increased waiting time because of the decreased supply of children and 
insecurity on the part of adoptive parents on whether or not they will be able to get a 
child at all. This does not work well with the fact that parents often start the adoption 
process later, after years of fertility treatment, which does not give them much time to 
work with (Saietz, 2013). As a consequence this might explain why adoption agencies in 
receiving countries increasingly look to less regulated markets i.e. countries that have 
not ratified the international legal regimes on intercountry adoption in order to find a 
large and steady supply of children at a shorter time frame. “Just as companies 
outsource industry to countries with lax labor laws and low wages, adoptions 
have moved to states with few laws about the process” (emphasis added) (Graff, 
2008:61).   
 
Price differentiation tendencies & market segmentation 
If intercountry adoption was to bear the resemblances of a free-market one would argue 
that the mechanisms of supply and demand would indeed affect the ‘price’ of the 
adopted children both in terms of price differentiation. In this part we are going to 
                                                          
13
 EU civil servant seconded by the European Commission and part of againstchildtrafficking.org 
Page 37 of 65 
 
analyze whether or not this is in fact the case in ICA. We are going to do this by applying 
the notions of price differentiation in child adoption put forward by Goodwin. Goodwin 
argues that a race-based baby valuing is taking place in the US, where US parents are 
willing to pay up to 50,000 USD for healthy, white infants compared to the fact that 
many black infants are adopted at much lower costs (4,000 USD). She argues further 
that  
Adoption agencies attempt to clarify this discrepancy by explaining that black 
children are more difficult to place than white children, and, therefore, the costs 
associated with adopting Caucasian children are higher. This logic appears 
flawed, even though it is true that black children wait longer for permanent 
placements. Why would it cost more to do less, if transaction costs were based 
purely on the labor and transactions involved? If placing white children is easier 
than placing black children, it would seem that less work would result in less pay 
and lower fees (Goodwin, 2006:67). 
As presented in the contextualization part the international regimes in ICA state that 
improper financial gain should be avoided in intercountry adoption and the HCCH 
further states that only fees and costs that are reasonable should be allowed in ICA. As 
agencies accredited under the HCCH must inform prospective adoptive parents of the 
costs involved in intercountry adoption many such agencies have chosen to reveal this 
on their website. An analysis of these websites shows that e.g. the two Danish adoption 
agencies have chosen very different models of payment. One of the agencies has a 
solidary fee for most sending countries, which is roughly around 16,000 USD. For four of 
the sending countries (Colombia, Taiwan, Philippines & Nigeria) there is a different fee, 
which according to the website is based on the actual budgeted expenditures. This fee 
amounts to 12,500 for two of the countries (Colombia & The Philippines) and 18,000 for 
the other two. This price differentiation makes one wonder what the numbers behind 
the solidary fee is then - something, which is not evident on the agency’s website. 
According to the adoption agency the thought behind the solidary fee is that, this way 
most parents pay the same. Hence, it will not be the price that determines where the 
parents adopt from. The agency states that the reason why some countries require 
higher prices is that these demand more from the case work.14  However, one of the 
countries she refers to as being more costly is Colombia, which is in fact one of the 
countries with the lowest price. In addition to this, other fees, such as a fee for 
                                                          
14
 Information from mail correspondence with a coordinator from AC International Child  
(Due to ethical considerations of anonymity, this will only be provided upon request) 
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registration in the sending country, add up to 12,000 USD (AC International Child, 
2013). At the other Danish adoption agency the cost of an adoption vary depending on 
the sending country. The reason for this is according to the website that the costs are 
based on the actual budgeted expenditures in each country plus the average 
expenditures for the agency in Denmark. The costs here are between 24,000 USD for the 
adoption of a child from Colombia and 44,800 USD for the adoption of a child from South 
Korea (DanAdopt, 2013). In the US the cost of adoption vary even more and many 
adoption agencies do not specify their costs online. However, according to the state 
official website on adoption there are different costs of intercountry adoption with 
HCCH sending countries and non-HCCH sending countries as the adoption process have 
different acquirements depending on the HCCH-status.15 By analyzing websites of 
HCCH-accredited agencies within the US it appears that the price for an intercountry 
adoption is between 20-40,000 USD including the expenditures of the agency (BAAS, 
2013).  
Generally, there seem to be no variation in the price of an intercountry adoption related 
to the race of the child adopted as e.g. the estimated costs of adopting a child from 
Uganda are the same as adopting a child from Korea with the US agencies (Ibid.). With 
one of the Danish adoption agencies, Ethiopia is in fact the fourth most expensive place 
to adopt a child from (DanAdopt, 2013). Neither does there seem to be any variation on 
the price of adoption depending on the gender or the health of the child as the costs are 
stated to be the same. Nevertheless, several articles have claimed that there seem to be 
some price differentiation for children with special need or children who are older 
(Graff, 2008). This seems to be supported by the fact that several states and agencies in 
the US have special grants for parents adopting older children or children with special 
needs, thereby ‘lowering’ the costs of these children (CWIG, 2001; Kidsfirstadoption, 
2013). There does not seem to be any price differentiation related to the waiting time 
involved in intercountry adoptions.      
 
Financial exchange 
Regardless of the before mentioned efforts of the different legal conventions on ICA, and 
the common ethical agreement that children are not and should not be treated as 
commodities, there are money involved in adoption. A lot of money. This money is 
                                                          
15
 This will change from July 14, 2014 with the effectuation of the Universal Accreditation Act 
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supposedly only covering the reasonable fees and expenses in the adoption but there is 
no way of knowing completely what the payment covers. Although many accredited 
adoption agencies have publicized their fees online they have not specified the 
components of the fees. As a result there is no way of knowing if some of the money is 
going to the birth parents or the persons in charge of the orphanage in the sending 
country. Goodwin cites Posner in her argument that  
Financial exchanges, including exorbitant fees paid to adoption agencies, medical 
payments to birth mothers (or surrogates in the case of in vitro babies), 
transportation costs and living expenses, while characterized under the umbrella 
of “transactional costs,” resemble “payments” in most other spheres (Goodwin, 
2006:65). 
Again although this argument relates to in-country or domestic adoption it is also the 
case for ICA. Post states that some of the money involved in ICA is used to ‘cultivate’ new 
contacts and new supply of children “You [adoption agencies] also have to have money 
for projects that you are offering to private orphanages and government agencies – it 
opens doors and creates contacts at all levels, if you have 10,000-20,000 euros to help a 
project” (Saietz, 2013). Another scholar who addresses the costs of ICA is Graff who 
argue that ICA fees are so disproportionally large for the sending countries that they 
encourage corruption (Graff, 2008). 
 
Social valuing in the ICA market 
For many prospective adoptive parents the choice of adopting a child through 
intercountry adoption is not much of a choice as many have exhausted all other options 
of getting a child before turning to ICA. Still, in the ICA process adoptive parents are 
faced with several choices to make, such as preferences regarding the sending country 
(race), gender of the child, age of the child and whether or not they are willing to adopt a 
child with special needs. This way the adoptive parents are able to assert their 
preferences for the child. It might cause a prolonged waiting time but in making such 
decisions the parents exercise a key component from the (free-) market: choice 
(Goodwin, 2006). On the other hand there are mechanisms within the adoption process 
that go against the ability of choice as some parents are less competitive players within 
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the adoption market. As all adoptive parents must be declared suitable for adoption16 
not only do the adoptive parents’ specific choices but also their personal, social and 
financial status play a role in the adoption process. The financial status even more so as 
the high costs of an intercountry adoption makes it unrealistic for people with a low 
income, thus favoring middle-class or higher income parents and preventing people 
with more limited resources from becoming parents (Goodwin, 2006). Goodwin argues 
that with free-market mechanisms within adoption in the US, the white middle class will 
always be able to outbid the black and typically low-income parents in a payment-race 
on wealthy white babies. Thus, maintaining the social, cultural and economic 
inequalities within society. In ICA however, one could argue that the entire adoption 
market is possible only because of, and at the same time maintaining, the structural 
differences between the developing and the developed countries. It is not the poor that 
adopt children within ICA; it is the wealthy white middleclass, whereby some sort of 
post-colonial power relation and inequality is sustained.         
As we have shown in the theory-part on markets, another important feature within 
markets are the market agents, which we will now proceed to analyze through a 
stakeholder-analysis. 
 
4.2 Which stakeholders are involved in the ICA market and how do they benefit 
from it? 
4.2.1 Adoption agencies 
As we have previously demonstrated, the market in ICA is contested and this raises 
difficulties in understanding the role and the interests of the adoption agencies as 
stakeholders in this market.  
In this section we seek to identify and analyze the motives and the gains that adoption 
agencies have in ICA. We are aware of the fact that a significant number of adoptions 
take place in non-convention countries, but due to the difficulties, and in some cases 
impossibility, to trace those activities, we have decided only to focus on adoptions that 
take place in convention-countries. 
                                                          
16
 In most receiving countries this is done through a Home Study, carried out by the parent’s home 
county or Regional state administration. 
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International adoption agencies are the key actors that provide services for adoptive 
parents.  In appliance with the HCCH (Article 10), only state-accredited bodies can 
provide adoption services17. As mentioned in previous parts these bodies are not to 
pursue commercial purposes and should be “directed and staffed by persons qualified 
by their ethical standards and by training or experience to work in the field of 
intercountry adoption” (HCCH, 1998: article 11). Due to this status of adoption service 
providers, as defined by the HCCH, they are supposed not to generate profits via 
providing adoption services. Thus the vast majority of the adoption agencies operating 
under the HCCH are claimed to be non-profit agencies. This raises questions about their 
role and interest in a market which generally, creates conditions for business and 
financial initiatives. As financial transactions and initiatives between adoptive parents 
and adoption agencies have been identified and widely discussed in previous section of 
this report, how can we then identify the role and interests of adoption agencies in the 
ICA market? 
Since most adoption agencies claim to be providers of nurturing homes for children and 
driven by the desire to address social problems, we can look at them through the 
conceptual lens of the social entrepreneurship model. O’Connor and Rotabi analyzing 
social entrepreneurship state that:  
(…) most adoption agencies in the United States are based on a social 
entrepreneurial model. Fundamentally, because of their structure and vision, ICA 
agencies are usually nonprofit organizations, operating within a profit venture 
which generates revenues (O’Connor and Rotabi in Gibbons and Rotabi, 
2012:77).  
We argue that the difference in the motivation between business and social 
entrepreneurship does not exclude basic income earning strategies among 
entrepreneurs. Thus, although accredited adoption agencies in the most cases address 
social problems they also pursue business strategies. Despite this, there is a lack of 
academic literature on the role and interests of adoption agencies and, a gap in the 
                                                          
17
   An accredited body shall: 
(a) pursue only non-profit objectives according to such conditions and within such limits as may be 
established by the competent authorities of the State of accreditation; 
(b) be directed and staffed by persons qualified by their ethical standards and by training or 
experience to work in the field of intercountry adoption; and  
(c) be subject to supervision by competent authorities of that State as to its composition, operation 
and financial situation 
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analysis of their entrepreneurial activities. There is at best a quiet set of “informal” 
sources that focus on the entrepreneurial success of adoption agencies. We have 
identified several websites which provide tips and advices on the opening and running 
an adoption agency with a view to succeed in the adoption industry. For instance, 
Gaebler, a web source for entrepreneurs, has provided essential information for 
prospective adoption entrepreneurs, underpinning the necessity of creating an agency 
website to attract prospective adoptees. It further emphasizes the ‘smart’ business plan 
creation and advice new adoption agencies to do an investigation of the competitors on 
the market (Gaebler, 2013). All of these are suggestions that highly resemble advices 
given to any new business entrepreneurs, regardless of the market.  
IBIS World, the provider of industry information in the US, has in January 2013 
conducted a market research on Adoption & Child Welfare Services in the US. According 
to this report, the total revenue in the adoption and welfare services in the US hovers 
around 13 billion USD with approximately 29,000 businesses involved in providing paid 
employment for 163, 000 persons (IBIS World, 2013). Although, there is no exact count 
of the number of ICA agencies in the world, it seems that, the number is growing.  Rotabi 
notes that, in 2009 in the US alone 300 agencies applied to be evaluated for approval to 
become service providers under the HCCH (Rotabi 2008 cited in Gibbons & Rotabi, 
2012).  
As argued earlier, although most accredited adoption agencies claim to be addressing 
social problems, they pursue real business strategies. In order to keep their business 
running adoption agencies apply entrepreneurial efforts such as demonstrating value 
proposition and creating awareness among childless adults, marketing ICA and promoting 
their services through social media and internet (see internet photolisting hereinafter), 
assessing fees for services, price differentiation (was discussed in previous chapter), & 
insuring a stable supply via business partner relationship management (Adamec & Miller, 
2007).  
Advertising and the usage of social media have been widely practiced among adoption 
facilitators since 1970. Photolisting and videotaping of children available for adoptions 
were presented in newspapers and on TV to recruit adoptive parents. “Giving a “face” 
and a description to a child inspires many adopting parents to select a particular child or 
at least ask for further information” (Adamec & Miller, 2007:213). With the 
advancements in technology, adoption agencies are increasingly using the internet to 
facilitate adoption by e.g. resorting to the use of online photolisting as their main 
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marketing tool. The US State Department defines Internet photolisting as “Internet 
listings of photographs or other information, concerning children, who are available for 
adoption, as well as the use of Internet to match children with prospective adoptive 
parents” (Memorandum on internet photolisting).  
Another entrepreneurial or business strategy that we can identify among adoption 
agencies is insuring a stable supply via business partner relationship management. On 
the example of two adoption agencies in Denmark, we can see that both of them support 
their sending countries with development aid. Even though DanAdopt and AC 
International Child claim that the aid they provide is value-based and philanthropic, we 
argue that via these aid activities, they ensure stable supply of children from their 
sending countries by creating ties and cooperative relationships with their partners in 
the sending countries - a clear business strategy to survive in a competitive market. This 
argument is supported by Bhargava who analyzes the role of adoption agencies from the 
US in relation to Indian adoption agencies. According to Bhargava, “foreign [adoption] 
agencies are funding Indian agencies, which means that a regular business relationship 
between agencies and foreign concerns has emerged” (Gibbons & Rotabi, 2012:80) 
 
Sending agencies 
Adoption agencies in sending countries can equally be analyzed by using the social 
entrepreneurial model. But, whereas the receiving agencies benefit from the huge fees 
paid to them by adoptees, the sending agencies equally benefit from the huge cost of 
registration and facilitation incur by the receiving agencies. In effect, the sending 
agencies benefit from ICA in the same manner that receiving agencies do. Thus, whether 
it is the laissez-fair entrepreneurial business model of receiving agencies that invokes 
the desire for profit among sending agencies (as suggested by Bhargava), or it is the self-
created initiative to benefit from adoption by the sending agencies; we argue that the 
mechanisms of supply and demand is very explicit in the way that, adoption agencies in 
receiving and sending countries cooperate with each other and mutually benefit from 
this co-operation (Gibbons & Rotabi 2012). 
4.2.2 Receiving and sending states  
Saunders has noted that, ICA is “affecting domestic politics and foreign policy from India 
to Guatemala” (Saunders, 2007). The case noted by Saunders is true not only in the 
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situations of India and Guatemala but also in other jurisdictions. Thus intercountry 
adoption plays a significant part in many crucial decisions and actions of nation states 
For instance, in 2001, Romania banned intercountry adoption to qualify for membership 
in the EU. Saunders, argues that, the banning of ICA by Romania “provoked a swift and 
vocal backlash from American families in the process of adopting Romanian children” 
(ibid: 9). Lobbied by prospective parents and their support groups, the United States 
petitioned Bucharest to back down their decision and also used the prospective 
membership of Romania in NATO as a tool of bargaining.  
The Financial Times published a leaked document which indicated that, the “US 
representative in Brussels threatened Romania’s entry into NATO if Bucharest 
continued its moratorium on international adoptions” (Saunders, 2007:10). Saunders 
indicates further that “the influential Congressional Coalition on Adoption, which 
includes international adoptive parent, Senator John McCain, subsequently sought to 
influence those involved in Romania’s NATO admission in order to shape the country’s 
policy on ICA” (Ibid.). 
The wife of Eduard Shevardnadze (former President of the Republic of Georgia), Mrs. 
Shevardnadze is reported to have publicly stated that: ‘I am categorically against foreign 
adoption. Our nation’s gene pool is being depleted. All Georgian people are suffering 
hardships. Let our children suffer, too” (Saunders, 2007:12). In 2004, after adopting a 
child from Russia, the downturn popularity of Schröder, the former German Chancellor 
dramatically reversed (Ibid). In other respect, The EU included abolition of ICA in the 
‘acquis communautaire’ (admission criteria) for states aspiring for its membership 
(Ibid.).  
We have presented the politicization, nationalist confrontation, and the hegemonic 
manipulations associated with intercountry adoption to show the centrality of ICA to 
states’ politics and also as a prelude for our attempt to identify and analyze the interests 
of receiving and sending states in intercountry adoption. 
 
Receiving states  
The interest of the state is to continue to get the support for its legitimacy and stay in 
power. Therefore, the state has to consider and meet the interests of the powerful 
classes among the population – however small their number may be. As observed earlier 
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in our market analysis, in the developed North the people who become eligible to adopt 
belong to the middle and upper classes that constitute a significant percentage of the 
population and are also very powerful in terms of finances and influence. Note also that, 
the adoption agencies employ and involve a large section of the population and are run 
by powerful and influential groups like lawyers, human rights activists, social workers 
etc. Hence, the question of employment also becomes important to the states. 
Consequently, in the wealthy North, which happens to be the leading receiving 
countries, governments act in favor of not only people who want to adopt but also the 
large number of people working in the adoption market.18  
Since ICA has become a legitimate way of building families and given that families are 
the basic unit of society, states, especially in receiving countries who benefit a lot in 
terms of the future human resources adopted children present, would naturally be 
inclined to support such an endeavor.  
In addition, another reason for receiving states to pay interest to the ICA-processes and 
the regulation hereof could be that, if scandals emerge, the public, the media and the 
political opposition could use it to criticize the government.  Summarily, we argue that 
the interests of receiving states in ICA are rooted in the states’ desire to enhance their 
legitimacy and their need to support the building of strategic institutions such as the 
family institution. Finally, states need to forestall adoption scandals which can be used 
to question their management of power.   
 
Sending states 
In most cases sending countries are faced with several problems in the economic, 
political and social spheres. Due to the fact that ICA is a complex, controversial and 
sensitive issue, governments in sending countries face serious dilemmas. On one hand 
being unable to provide the basic needs for the abandoned children and families’ states 
recognize ICA as one of the solution to the domestic socioeconomic problems, by 
sending children, whom it has no readily available resources to cater for, to other 
countries for them to be cared for. On the other hand, sending the children abroad 
creates a negative image, a clear indictment on the government as incapable of taking 
care of the most vulnerable and precious group of the population and selling national 
                                                          
18
 See how and why US and other receiving countries fought for the HCCH to become pro-
intercountry adoption in the forthcoming analysis of ICA Regimes 
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gene fond abroad. This populist idea and perspective on ICA is quite broad among 
sending countries. In some case, for instance as in Russia, a significant slowdown of ICA 
was justified by populists manifest in Duma to ban ICA in order to prevent the sale of 
Russian children to the West.  As argued by many commentators, this was a result of a 
game of combating political vectors.  As Boris Altshuler puts it: “This is a political game 
of high-level, where children are held hostage. Some influential forces in Russia want to 
undermine Putin's course for closer cooperation with the West” (Newsru, 2005)  
At the same time a state is an international actor and has to pursue its interests on the 
international arena. As the practice of ICA has an international dimension we can 
assume that interests of both receiving and sending countries must be taken into 
consideration when dealing with ICA internationally. As the relationship between 
countries is based on various aspects of the political, economic and social spheres, it can 
be difficult to allocate and identify the motives and interests that drive cooperation of 
the states on ICA.  
As reflected in the analysis above, the legislative and regulative powers of (sending and 
receiving) states on the ICA market make them extremely influential stakeholders. 
States have direct powers to pursue policies that are more open for ICA or ban ICA 
entirely. Thus, since states are in charge of decision formulation and implementation, 
they can place restrictions and controls over the process thereby making adoption very 
difficult and in some cases impossible. Aside their influences, states also have real 
interests in ICA which they use all possible means to protect. A case in point is the 
aforementioned incredible extent US went, as far as using NATO as a platform for 
Romania to back down its moratorium on international adoptions.  
4.2.3 International Organizations (IO’s) and Non-governmental organizations 
(NGO’s) 
A prominent aspect of globalization is the increasingly significant role of international 
institutions (II’s), international organizations (IO’s) and non-state actors such as 
multinational companies (MNC’s), non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and 
international non-governmental institutions (INGO’s). (Higgott, 1999:24) In the second 
half of the 20th century these have grown both in number and in their importance in 
global matters. (O’Brien, 2013:101) Higgott argues that although nation states still have 
a significant role to play regarding decision making, “the actors and arenas of policy 
contest, both public and private, that once operated within states are becoming 
increasingly internationalized” (Higgott, 1999: 29). 
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The recent growth in the number of inter-state/supranational organizations impact 
states, corporations and citizens highly as they are increasingly governed through these 
organizations (O’Brien, 2013: 102). Also for-profit and non-profit organizations have 
increased in number and scope over the last decade or so and they are increasingly 
doing so through establishing international or transnational organizations. Many of 
these organizations work through advocacy and lobbying international institutions and 
governments of nation-states for a specific cause (Ibid.). 
When analyzing the potential benefits of ICA for international organizations such as the 
UN, UNICEF etc. it is important to pay attention to their purpose and the strategy. Where 
the purpose of the IO’s is to secure their position in the market-liberal ideological mode 
through universalizing and increasing their membership, the NGO’s and INGO’s seek to 
change the global order and policy through highly normative and politicized behavior 
(Higgott, 999:30). This also links highly to the question of neutrality; whether or not the 
different actors beyond the states should be seen as vehicles for the pursuit of state 
interests or sites where various demands and interests of state and non-state actors can 
be handled (Ibid.:33). 
One way to analyze the interest of NGOs and IO’s in ICA is in their willingness to 
reinforce their position and promote their ideas on global matters. An example of this 
was with the creation and promotion of the CRC, where several NGO’s and IO’s played a 
significant role in the drafting and monitoring of the CRC principles. Woll (2001) argues 
that several NGO’s and UNICEF, who took an active part in the creation of CRC and 
integrating it into their work, has gained an important role in the decision-making 
process and policy implementation in the countries that ratified the convention.  She 
draws attention to the “special role” of UNICEF, which CRC assigned it for (Woll, 2001). 
UNICEF recognizes its influential role by stating that:  
UNICEF is the driving force that helps build a world where the rights of every 
child are realized. We have the global authority to influence decision-makers, and 
the variety of partners at grassroots level to turn the most innovative ideas into 
reality.  That makes us unique among world organizations, and unique among 
those working with the young (UNICEF website). 
Supporting this point, Oestreich(1998) states:  
The convention serves UNICEF's purposes as much as UNICEF serves those of the 
convention. Where UNICEF claims that the CRC legitimizes and contextualizes its 
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operations, as often as not it also provides a pretext for expanding UNICEF's work 
well beyond what was originally part of its mandate (Oestreich, 1998:191). 
The interest of NGO’s and IO’s in the ICA market are thus quite difficult to define because 
one cannot clearly associate them with any profit motives. However it is safe to say that 
it is in their interest to promote their ideas and agenda, and get more influence in 
decision making on sensitive and crucial global issues such as intercountry adoption. We 
will elaborate more on the role that UNICEF played in the establishment of the ICA 
Regimes in the forthcoming part of the analysis. 
Based on the analysed inherent market features in ICA and the stakeholders attempts to 
influence the ICA process it is worth noticing the lack of international monitoring and 
legal organs to oversee the compliance with the regimes. As presented in the theory-
part the ratification of the ICA regimes build on the voluntary principle which means 
that neither sending nor receiving countries in ICA are obliged to accept the regimes as a 
criteria for intercountry adoption to take place. This further indicates that although hard 
attempts are made by IO’s such as UN and UNICEF to regulate the sensitive issue of ICA 
it is essentially the nation states that have most power over the ICA market.     
4.3 What is the role of the CRC & the HCCH in ICA? 
As shown in the previous part, states and IO’s play a significant role as stakeholders in 
ICA as their positions and interest are what guide the regulation of ICA. Thus, we now 
concern ourselves with the international regulative framework - the regimes - on ICA. As 
demonstrated in the conceptual part the regimes in ICA are supposedly reflecting the 
interests of the states that have ratified them, but as we will elaborate on in this part, 
there is more to the regimes than just that.  
4.3.1 International regimes on intercountry adoption 
This section contains an analysis of the international regimes on intercountry adoption, 
namely the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption (HCCH). The analysis encompasses the following points: The 
main actors who spearheaded the establishment of the various regimes; how the tenors 
of the regimes became reflective of the positions and interests of the strong actors; and 
the use of power and influence in shaping the norms and principles underpinning the 
various regimes. Attempts are made to link the evolution and establishment of the ICA 
regimes to the Liberal Institutionalists and Realists viewpoints described in the theory-
Page 49 of 65 
 
part. This will provide a practical outlook on how the theoretical propositions of these 
schools of thought manifest themselves in the real world. 
4.3.2 The CRC  
To mark the International Year of the Child in 1979, the Polish delegation to the UN 
proposed that the (world) governing body should make a “binding Convention on the 
Rights of the Child” (Oestreich, 1998:185). This led to the coming into force of the 
“Convention on the Rights of the Child” on 2nd September 1990. As noted elsewhere, the 
Convention contains several provisions on the rights of the child, but the relevant 
provision specifically dealing with adoption is Article 21, which sets out the basic 
principles to be followed when considering domestic and intercountry adoption for a 
child. It considers Intercountry Adoption only “if the child cannot be placed in a foster or 
an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's country 
of origin” (CRC, 1989:art. 21b). 
As previously touched upon, analysts and children’s rights commentators argue that, the 
CRC prefers “in-country care” to “intercountry adoption”. They argue that this reflective 
of the position held by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) on adoption. Our 
evidence suggest that UNICEF, although “originally declined to participate in its [CRC’s] 
drafting”, “actively” [shaped] “provisions of the convention to fit its own desires” 
(Oestreich, 1998:185).  
The influence of UNICEF on CRC might have been very weighty because it is the only 
“specialized body” that was expressly mentioned in the Convention (CRC, 1989:art. 45a 
& 45b). Apparently, “when the implementation provisions of the convention were being 
discussed, [there was] a proposal to specifically mention UNICEF as "the lead agency for 
children", but that was rejected. Also, there was “a proposal to make UNICEF an official 
body for monitoring the convention [which] was also rejected as too provocative” 
(Oestreich, 1998:185). Clearly, there is substantial evidence in support of the claim that, 
the signature of UNICEF was all over the CRC document.  
In the absence of the evidences cited above, the disposition of UNICEF, its centrality to 
the CRC and self-election to monitor and coordinate the implementation progress of the 
Convention provide unquestionable evidence in support of the claim that UNICEF as an 
IO has a real interest in the creation and implementation of the Convention. By mid-
1990, the CRC had become a sort of unofficial constitution of UNICEF, with almost every 
facet of its operations directed toward the Convention's implementation. UNICEF’s 
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operations are now routinely justified, and progress measured, with reference to the 
goals of the CRC (Oestreich, 1998). 
Although, the CRC “is frequently described as the instrument that represented a 
revolution in international children's rights [as human beings]” (Dillon, 2003: 190), 
strangely, pro human rights nations such as the United States and some Western 
countries were subtly opposed to some of its provisions. As a matter of fact, “the United 
States was among the last nations to sign the convention” (Oestreich, 1998:186). Again, 
in spite of the coming into force of the Convention as far back as 1990 (23 years ago), 
the US, which is the most prominent receiving state in ICA, is yet to ratify the Convention 
(Carlson, 1994; Kapstein, 2003; Bartholet, 2010). But why is it that the US did not use its 
huge influence in the UN to veto the CRC or parts of it? This question becomes most 
pertinent when related to the Realist argument, that sometimes hegemons veto regimes 
that run counter to their interest and, other times they use their powers “to determine 
the shape of” regimes (Little, 2008:308). Indeed the US has such a reputation19 (Ibid..; 
Schwartz, 2010). Oestreich provides perhaps the most convincing answer to this 
question. He notes that, the US and the opposition states did not resort to vetoing the 
CRC as a whole or in parts because they “clearly felt it would be bad public relations to 
publicly oppose a "children's charter," (Oestreich, 1998:186). This effectively validates 
the Realists argument that, sometimes, states would still adhere to principles and norms 
underlying a regime that they oppose (Little, 2008).  
4.3.3 The HCCH  
Most legal discussions of intercountry adoption begin with an analysis of the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption (HCCH), since it is the principal international 
instrument that (purports) to set standards and define norms in this area. It is 
important to note that the Hague Convention is not a human rights convention per se; it 
is an agreement on the standards to be observed where intercountry adoption occurs. 
Given that HCCH was “designed principally to set up a mechanism for international 
cooperation to give practical effect to the CRC provisions relating to intercountry 
adoption” (UNICEF, 1998:5), its drafting was fiercely deliberated upon (Carlson, 1994; 
Dillon, 2003).  
Carlson presents the tone of the discussion at the Hague Conference on intercountry 
adoption as follows:  
                                                          
19 Such accounts can e.g. be found in the formation of the international regimes after World War II. 
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In general there were two camps. Receiving nations such as the United States 
tended to be most eager to endorse intercountry adoption and facilitate the 
adoption process. On the other side were those participants and observers who 
believed the Convention should be primarily restrictive: to eliminate abuses such 
as baby-selling; to protect a child's right to grow up in the land of its birth, or a 
nation's right to prevent the loss of its natural resources - children - to other 
nations; and with the possible effect of reducing intercountry adoption. Nations of 
origin were especially prone to skepticism or embarrassment about a phenomena 
frequently mischaracterized by the media as exporting babies, and their 
suspicions were fed by concurrent crises and scandals of baby selling in former 
Communist and lesser developed countries (Carlson, 1994:14 – 15). 
Recall that, in our regime theory discussion, we showed how Realists argue that the 
hegemon generally uses its powers to ensure that, “regimes [are] underpinned by a 
particular set of principles and norms” that promote and sustain “its own long – term 
interest” (Little, 2008: 305). Contrary to this, is the Liberal Institutionalists argument, 
which states that there can be a benign hegemon or powerful actor, who would use its 
power to catalyze the formation of regimes for public good. In the establishment of the 
HCCH, the Realists argument prevailed because eventually the Hague Convention 
"clearly [favored] intercountry adoption over all other alternatives except in-country 
adoption, and it [encouraged] a more favorable and cooperative attitude toward 
intercountry adoption" (Dillon, 2003: 215). Hence, the receiving countries and the US 
used their powers to determine the shape of the regime. 
In view of the disposition of the receiving countries and the US in the deliberation 
process we agree with Carlson that “the pro-adoption tone in the [Hague] Convention 
was inevitable” (Carlson, 1994: 256). However, we say that Dillon’s argument; that the 
receiving countries and US eagerness for a more benevolent approach for intercountry 
adoption was understandable, raises a serious unanswered question. Dillon submitted 
inter alia that, during deliberations “(...) the receiving countries understandably [were] 
more eager to establish a hierarchy of approaches in favor of intercountry adoption” 
(emphasis added) (Dillon, 2003:215). Drawing Dillon’s observation to its logical 
conclusion creates a suspicion that the eagerness of the US and the other receiving 
countries for a less restricted intercountry adoption was purposive or interest oriented. 
In other words, the receiving countries sought to achieve a certain interest by pushing 
for the Convention to be favorably oriented towards a less restricted process of 
intercountry adoption. We ask ourselves, what peculiar interest did the US and the 
Western receiving countries have in mind when they were pushing for more favorable 
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provisions towards intercountry adoption? The answer to this question is not far away. 
Once again recall from our discussion on the history and development of intercountry 
adoption that, in the “baby boom” generation, two demographic changes were 
differently experienced in the developed countries in the North and the developing 
countries in the South: 1) In the developed countries in the North demographic and 
social changes20 simultaneously increased people’s need for children and reduced the 
number of children available for domestic adoption. 2) In the developing South, high 
incidence of unplanned births, poverty and fertility rates, and restrictive abortion 
regulations led to a large number of children in need of adoption (Graff, 2008; UNICEF, 
1998). So whereas in Western countries, the number of eligible children for domestic 
adoption were in shortage relative to demand, in the developing countries they were in 
excess of demand.  
Be reminded that, this development was the root cause of “the “mass exportation” of 
children from economically developing nations” to developed countries in the 1970s 
which raised eyebrows globally (UNICEF, 1998: 2). Accordingly, in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary, it can be safely held that, the western countries (notably 
France, Sweden, Holland, Italy and Switzerland) and the US (herein called receiving 
countries) pushed for a less restrictive provision on intercountry adoption so as to, 
through the HCCH, legitimize their ‘import’ of children from the developing countries to 
meet the demand at home.   
Strangely, missing in matters of HCCH is the influence of UNICEF, which actively shaped 
the CRC – the base law for HCCH. As indicated earlier, UNICEF is labeled as being 
favorably disposed to in-country care such as family adoption, foster care and 
institutionalization and therefore does not identify with the intercountry friendly nature 
of the HCCH, hence the organization’s failure to frontally support the Convention. Dillon 
leads the accusation with this charge:  
A global agency such as UNICEF has the capacity to take on the task of providing 
oversight for the ethical adoption of children but it, like other agencies charged 
with the care of children, has frequently articulated an at best ambiguous, and at 
worst implicitly hostile, view of international adoption (Dillon, 2003:254).  
                                                          
20
 E.g. increased use of contraceptive aids, the legalization of abortion, the higher workforce 
participation of women, the postponement of childbirth to later ages and an increasing de-
stigmatization of single motherhood, infertility and highly regulated domestic adoption processes in 
developed countries. 
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It is not only Dillon who has criticized UNICEF’s attitude towards the HCCH and 
intercountry adoption, UNICEF has received quite a good backlash from some politically 
influential personalities as well. On April 28, 2003, a letter appeared in the Weekly 
Standard from Lawrence Lindsey, former economic advisor in the Bush administration, 
entitled "Don't Trust the International Bureaucrats to be Humanitarians”.  In the letter, 
Mr. Lindsey expressed extreme displeasure at what he perceived to be U.N., and more 
specifically UNICEF policy, which prevents children in conflict situations from being 
adopted out of country, even when the evidence suggests that there is no hope of family 
reunification or extended family care. According to Mr. Lindsey, in spite of the crucial 
need of two orphans for a family during the Kosovo crisis, he and his wife did everything 
but were unsuccessful in bringing them to the United States. Mr. Lindsey therefore 
concluded that: "It is the official policy of UNICEF and the United Nations to permit no 
transnational adoption wherever the UN has jurisdiction" (The Weekly Standard, 
2003:22 cited in Dillon, 2003: 256).  
Clearly as evidenced in the analyses above, consistent with the general trend in regimes 
establishment, although regimes are meant to address common global challenges, 
during deliberations, various actors seek to argue their interests into the provisions of 
the regimes as seen in how the ICA Regimes were established.   
4.4 How do international regimes on intercountry adoption link to the analyzed 
market features in ICA? 
As we have analyzed the market features inherent in ICA, the stakeholders involved and 
the role of the regimes, we now move on to analyze how the regimes link to the market 
features in ICA. The purpose hereof is to see whether they oppose each other or are 
complementary. 
4.4.1 Regimes and supply & demand  
 The ICA Regimes provide for the procedures that must be followed in respect of 
processing children for intercountry adoption. The regimes therefore have considerable 
effects on both the supply and demand for adoptable children. On the supply side, since 
the regimes place injunction on state parties to for instance, take thorough steps to 
establish the eligibility of children before placing them for adoption, it regulates and in 
some cases limit the rate of supply. An example of this is found in the case of Guatemala: 
As a result of taking steps to meet the requirements of the HCCH at the behest of the 
United States in 2007, the number of adoptions processed from Guatemala to the US 
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reduced from 4,726 in 2007 to 7 in 2012. An explanation for this is also found in the fact 
that the US has determined, “(…) that Guatemala has not yet fully implemented 
legislation that would create a Convention-compliant adoption process” (U.S 
Department of state, 2013) and, that Guatemala since 2010 has a new adoption law that 
favors domestic adoption over intercountry adoption.  
On the demand side, when adoption procedures are measured against the requirements 
of the regimes and scandals become known and publicized through the media and 
internet, prospective adoptive parents hold back their demands. This is further 
emphasized when they come to recognize that the children being put up for adoption in 
some cases are not real orphans or children in need of families. As explained in the case 
of Guatemala stricter regulation in the country led to a reduction in the number of 
children supplied to the US. Another side of the story could be, as argued by Post, that 
reports of scandals, abuses and corruption in adoption result in “fewer and fewer new 
applicants who join” agencies’ waiting lists for adoptable children. She attributes the 
declined number in applications for adoption in Denmark to reports on child trafficking, 
abuses and corruption in children being brought from some parts of Africa. Post 
submitted that with 245 applications in the first 10 months of 2013 a new low record is 
reached, especially when compared to 2012 where 438 persons applied for adoption 
and 600 the year before that (Post reported by Saietz, 2013). 
Applying this argument of Post, we argue that, the scandals and the many reported cases 
of corruption and abuses by the media in 2007 may have led to the decrease in the 
demand for Guatemalan children by adoptive parents in the US (Selman 2012; Saietz, 
2013). 
What happens when a country tighten its regulation on intercountry adoption through 
the ratification of the HCCH is, as shown in the analysis of the market features, that the 
market including supply and demand of children moves to non-convention countries. 
This explains why relatively few adoption cases are processed in accordance with the 
‘rules’ of the regimes, while the number of countries ratifying the HCCH continues to 
increase. For instance, for five of the biggest receiving countries (Canada, France, Italy, 
Spain and the United States), only 6,686 or 29.2% of their 22,883 intercountry 
adoptions in 2008 was processed from convention-countries, while 16,197, or 70.8% 
came from non-convention countries (Boéchat & Fuentes, 2010).  
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4.4.2 Regimes and price disparities in adoption service charges    
As discussed in the analyses of the market features and the regimes, the regimes state 
that, no one can derive improper financial gains from intercountry adoption, but 
adoption agencies are allowed to charge reasonable fees to cover the cost of processing 
adoptions.  The regimes however do not specify what constitute improper financial 
gains. Neither do they specify what is included in reasonable costs. It is therefore up to 
each state or each adoption agency to determine what it sees as proper and reasonable 
costs related to ICA.  
As illustrated in the analysis of the market features agencies generally quantify the cost 
of service to include the agencies’ expenses in respect of the case being processed and 
the expenses they make in respect of registrations and facilitation from the sending 
country. However, with no actual guidelines or specifications in the regimes the costs 
vary greatly from country to country and even from agency to agency. An example of 
this is found in the case of Denmark where the two adoption agencies have very 
different prices for the same service (see analysis on market features). Whereas one 
agency operates with a solidary fee in adoption from most sending countries, the other 
claims to base its fees on the actual calculated costs. Both of them are claiming that their 
pricing on adoption is the most fair (DanAdopt, 2013; AC International Child, 2013). 
This means that prospective adoptive parents can never be sure what costs they have to 
pay, as adoption agencies can use the lack of specification to compete on the price of 
service - a clear indication that, market forces still prevail in ICA despite the regimes’ 
efforts to regulate them. Neither of the two regimes (the CRC and the HCCH) engages 
with country-specific costs or regulation of ICA in terms of race, gender and health. They 
only state that the adoption shall be in the best interest of the child, leaving the decision 
of a possible price differentiation on the basis of these factors up to the regulation of the 
states and the ethical standards of the agencies.  
4.4.3 Regimes and financial exchange  
Regimes are meant to regulate the financial transactions in ICA to avoid the 
appropriation of improper financial gains. However, the regulation implies state control 
and that states have to establish institutions to regulate the market. As noted by 
McKinney, most countries especially sending countries “lack the funds, human resources 
and knowledge necessary to create an efficient functioning of [the] adoption system” 
(McKinney,2007: 395). This can potentially leave the ICA market unregulated leading to 
corruption and abuse. In the case of Ethiopia, who are yet to sign the HCCH and the CRC 
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the rapid increase in the number of children going for ICA (from a total of 262 in 2002 to 
4,596 in 2009) the regulators’ are unable to oversee the system. “More than a dozen 
Western countries and several thousand prospective families are waiting for Ethiopian 
children. Such high “demand,” combined with the possibility of earning a year’s income 
in adoption fees per child, can tempt the unscrupulous to procure children for adoption 
at all costs” (Brandeis University, 2012). In Guatemala the process of meeting the 
demands for regulation of the financial transactions in ICA is still an ongoing process. 
Although the country has accessed the HCCH, many of the receiving countries still do not 
recognize the accession as they believe that Guatemala is still not able to meet the 
requirements of the HCCH on intercountry adoption (HCCH(a), 2013). 
Another aspect of the link between the regimes and the financial exchange is the 
payment of financial incentives. The HCCH mentions persons involved in adoptions 
including the directors, administrators and employees of bodies involved in an adoption 
as those who can charge fees for costs and expenses related to adoptions. (HCCH, 1998: 
art.32.3) There is no mention of whether and to what extent a child’s birth parents can 
receive coverage of expenses related to the child but there have been several reports 
that financial incentives and exchanges have been made between the adoption agencies 
and birth parents. For example:  
A 2007 Hague fact-finding mission reported that, despite community disapproval, 
some rural Guatemalan families spoke openly about selling babies for $300 to 
support their families. Manuel Manrique of UNICEF Guatemala reports that thirty 
percent of children sent abroad were relinquished by women who gave up several 
children—not all at once, but year after year, suggesting that pregnancy had 
become a salaried job (Brandeis(a), 2012).  
As this example is from 2007 i.e. after Guatemala accessed the HCCH, one could argue 
that the regimes have not been able to completely prevent or diminish unregulated 
financial exchange in intercountry adoption. When this observation is linked to the huge 
number of adoption cases that were being processed from Guatemala prior to this fact-
finding mission, one cannot rule out the possibility that, the higher demand for children 
from Guatemala accounted for the agencies’ resort to unethical methods to supply more 
children to meet the increased demand for adoption – a clear evidence that the adoption 
was driven by the forces of demand and supply. Either way, the regimes did not remove 
the agencies’ incentives to pay birth parents to give up the child for adoption, despite 
the focus on eradication of improper financial gains in ICA.  
Page 57 of 65 
 
5. Concluding reflections 
5.1 Conclusion 
As thoroughly demonstrated in the report, globalization and the use of internet have 
dramatically impacted on intercountry adoption. Whilst heightened consumerism has 
increased the demand for adoptive children, adoption agencies have resorted to the use 
of mass media and the internet as means to attract prospective adoptees. Intercountry 
adoption has thus become driven by market forces (demand and supply) and a lucrative 
profit-making activity, in which adoptive children have been subjected to the market 
mechanisms as commodities, rather than a child welfare model for abandoned, abused, 
neglected and orphaned children.  
As elaborated throughout the report, the intercountry adoption regimes (CRC & HCCH) 
were established as a response to these market forces that made their way into 
intercountry adoption. The regimes made states central to intercountry adoption. The 
states are to control and regulate their respective domestic adoption markets. They are 
to establish central institutions to evaluate and certify non-profit agencies to provide 
adoption services. The states also have the foremost responsibility to cooperate with 
other states to prevent improper financial gains, the sale of children and the use of 
unethical methods from ICA.  
In view of regimes theorists’ argument that, the establishment of regimes is an effective 
way of dealing with common global challenges and Polanyi’s emphasis on the capacity of 
the state to control market, the expectation was that, the ICA regimes would root out the 
financial and profiteering incentives that led to the construction of a market in 
intercountry adoption. However, as we have evidenced, the market dimensions and 
forces are still prevalent in ICA despite the regimes. Thus among others, huge financial 
transactions which lead to profit appropriation are still evident in ICA with adoption 
agencies busily using the internet and the mass media soliciting for customers. There is 
even evidence that, adoption agencies, just as decidedly profiteering-businessmen and 
women, pursue real income earning strategies with the view of succeeding in the 
adoption industry, contrary to their claim of serving a social mission. 
On the basis of our analysis and our appreciation of the regimes, we argue that, the 
market in ICA prevails despite the regimes because, although the regimes emerged 
against the backdrop of the market tendencies, the regimes necessarily did not seek to 
entirely oust the financial and market incentives from ICA. Instead they sought to 
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regulate the market tendencies in such a way that it would prevent the adopted children 
from becoming commodities and the adoption process from succumbing to free-market 
tendencies.  
Thus, with the analyzed emphasis by the regimes’ on the requirements of adoption fees 
to be reasonable and proper, we argue that, the regimes’ approval of reasonable fees 
actually reinforces and sustains the ICA market. Whereas adoptive parents use the 
regimes’ approval of reasonable fees to justify their paying for their desire to have 
children and establish families through adoption, the agencies hide behind the 
vagueness of what a reasonable fee is to gain profits, though they claim to be non-profit.  
Based on the analysed inherent market features in ICA and the stakeholders attempts to 
influence the ICA process it is worth noticing the lack of international monitoring and 
legal organs to oversee the compliance with the regimes. As presented in the theory-
part the ratification of the ICA regimes build on the voluntary principle which means 
that neither sending nor receiving countries in ICA are obliged to accept the regimes as a 
criteria for intercountry adoption to take place. This further indicates that although hard 
attempts are made by IO’s such as UN and UNICEF to regulate the sensitive issue of ICA, 
it is essentially the nation states that have most power over the ICA market.     
5.2 Further research 
Some interesting issues caught our attention that, but for time and resources, we would 
have investigated further. We therefore call for further studies on these. 
First, adoption agencies’ claim of pursuing a social mission – Although we did slightly 
touched upon this “black box” , we were unable to deeper reflect on it, given limitations 
like the unavailability of full financial and budget statements of the agencies. We think 
that, the social entrepreneurship model that, we briefly applied in our work, would be 
useful to such studies. 
Second, as evidenced in our work, the number of adoptions globally, dropped 
considerably in the years 2007 and 2008. Curiously, the drop in the number of 
adoptions neatly coincides with the period when the world was struck by a serious 
financial crisis, popularly called the ‘credit crunch’. We are of the considered view that, 
an investigation, mounted to find out whether or not the financial crisis correlated with 
the decline in intercountry adoption would be very interesting. We feel that, such a 
study is necessary especially because of the measly economic research on intercountry 
adoption and the level of states involvement in ICA.  
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Third, a study on the efficiency of the ICA regimes in the market would be useful in view 
of the involvement of sensitive subjects like children. As shown in our analysis, several 
international and domestic socioeconomic and political factors and interests combine to 
influence actors’ behaviors in the ICA market. An investigation on, whether the interests 
of vulnerable children are overlooked or not in the mix of these competing interests, 
would be useful for policy formulation and implementation.  
Finally, as clearly illuminated by our work, there is unquestionable evidence that, the 
issue of (fictitious) commodification, marketization and financialization chiefly manifest 
in intercountry adoption. Unquestionable too, is the fact that, globalization has altered 
the course of ICA. We therefore call for a GPE focus on ICA. This would not only add 
depth to the literature on ICA but also, by expanding the field of research in ICA, nation 
states would benefit from the findings of informed GPE researches by incorporating 
them into deliberations on ICA, to make it a more useful project for children and 
humankind in general. 
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